

# *Diversity of Roman Catholics in Poland and Their Socio-Institutional Preferences*

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The processes of institutionalising religion as a social phenomenon are usually connected with its role as a medium between the sacred and the secular.<sup>1</sup> A characteristic aspect of these processes is the creation of religion-based relations between the spiritual experience shared by people and the institutional manifestation of religion in the political domain, including the legitimisation of power by religious authorities.<sup>2</sup> The political link between *throne* and *temple* can have diverse expressions existing within the universum whose extremes are: a confessional state where institutions are subjected to religious power on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a state where religion does not affect politics at all. These extreme varieties are rather theoretical in nature, first of all due to the impact of the community and its will concerning these relations. Religion may also serve as, for example, a moderator of attitudes to and opinions on social and political institutions,<sup>3</sup> or as a factor supporting engagement in initiatives which require civic participation.<sup>4</sup>

Religion is a factor that diversifies political attitudes. The classic concept by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan treats the religious/secular division as one of the four cleavages (the others are centre/periphery, urban/rural and capital/labour)<sup>5</sup> determining the political structure of communities in democratic states. The character of democratic transformation in post-communist countries clearly shows the specificity of the cleavage development. Herbert Kitschelt points out the formation role of the division into “religious fundamentalists” and “secular libertarians” that inte-

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1 Fiona Bowie, “The Anthropology of Religion”, in: Robert A. Segal (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006, 3-24.

2 Pippa Norris – Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, 66.

3 Diетram A. Scheufele – Matthew C. Nisbet – Dominique Brossard, “Pathways to Political Participation? Religion, Communication Contexts, and Mass Media”, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 15/3, 2003, 300-324.

4 Michael A. Jones-Correa – David L. Leal, “Political Participation: Does Religion Matter?”, *Political Research Quarterly* 54/4, 2001, 751-770.

5 Seymour M. Lipset – Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction”, in: iid. (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, New York: Free Press 1967, 1-64.

grates citizens on both sides of the political dispute: Christian-national authoritarianism versus social libertarianism and cosmopolitanism.<sup>6</sup> In Poland, the role of the religious factor in politics is even stronger due to the engagement of the Roman Catholic Church in the democratic transition, which had an impact on the mobilisation of religious and national identities.<sup>7</sup> Religion also influences citizens' opinions and evaluations with reference to the expected institutional solutions.<sup>8</sup> Religion may shape attitudes in two basic directions. The first of them involves creating a common system of values and legitimisations for the overlapping of the sacred and the secular, or the coexistence of material and spiritual issues. The other direction, opposite to the first one, involves perceiving religion as a factor promoting socially alienating attitudes. Its paradigm is to insulate one's religious activity from the social environment.<sup>9</sup> The outcome is another system of reference, in which faith must compete with the laic social environment, leading to the marginalisation of non-religious issues.<sup>10</sup>

The beginning of democratic revolutions in the Christian world assumed that the sphere of religion would be separate from the sphere of politics. Even Tocqueville noticed that in America, religion had its natural boundaries: the religious order was totally distinct from the political order; therefore, it was easy to change former laws without undermining former beliefs.<sup>11</sup> Progressing secularisation of the public sphere and the development of social institutions designed to guard values such as tolerance or the freedom of speech is a natural consequence of democratisation processes. All this takes place as part of communities adapting to changing political and social conditions.<sup>12</sup> Some of the processes are natural – relationships between democracy and politics are formed by each other. But there is also the model of “hostile separation”, i.e. legal control of religion by the state. With regard to this model, religion has been considered the enemy of progress, modernity and democracy, and anticlerical movements

6 Herbert Kitschelt, “Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions”, *Party Politics* 1/4, 1995, 447-472.

7 Madalena Meyer Resende, *Catholicism and Nationalism: Changing Nature of Party Politics*, Abingdon – New York: Routledge 2015, 34.

8 Bernadette C. Hayes, “The Impact of Religious Identification on Political Attitudes: An International Comparison”, *Sociology of Religion* 56/2, 1995, 177-194.

9 Miklós Tomka, “Secularization or Anomy? Interpreting Religious Change in Communist Societies”, *Social Compass* 38/1, 1991, 93-102.

10 Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York: Open Road 1967, 47-62.

11 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002, 581-585.

12 Giovanna Borradori, *Rozmowy amerykańskie*, trans. Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Poznań: W Drodze 1999, 145 (English transl.: Giovanna Borradori, *The American Philosopher*, trans. by Rosanna Crocitto, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994).

or political parties have become active in Europe and both Americas.<sup>13</sup> Some scholars, however, point out religion's structure-forming function in democratic processes. In other words, democratic processes can be socially legitimised thanks to structuring the political sphere with religious values.<sup>14</sup>

Relations between religion and politics are a popular subject of research, but the subject of socio-political orders<sup>15</sup> is usually studied in a very general way.<sup>16</sup> This is due to the multilevel character of mutual relationships, thanks to which we can investigate hypothetical relations in many fields.<sup>17</sup> The influence of religiosity on the represented democratic attitudes refers to two models. In the first of them, religiosity supports democratic attitudes, being a foundation for them in building the expected social and political competencies of citizens.<sup>18</sup> The other model assumes competition between religiosity and democratic attitudes, especially as regards the values represented in the attitudes and the role attributed to citizens in society.<sup>19</sup> We agree with Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan<sup>20</sup> that the influence of religiosity on democratic attitudes is context-based and results from factors characteristic for particular countries and communities. The same religion can evoke in its believers extremely different attitudes to democracy, depending on different national and social contexts.<sup>21</sup> This

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- 13 C. Thomas McIntire, "The Shift from Church and State to Religions as Public Life in Modern Europe", *Church History* 71/1, 2002, 152-167.
  - 14 Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon and Schuster 2000, 53-56.
  - 15 By the "socio-political order", we mean a system of rules and norms, either sanctioned by the law or developed by the community, which apply within the framework of a democratic system.
  - 16 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Some Reflections on the Significance of Max Weber's Sociology of Religions for the Analysis of Non-European Modernity", *Archives de sociologie des religions* 32/1, 1971, 29-52; Vyacheslav Karpov, "Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework", *Journal of Church and State* 52/2, 2010, 232-270; David Mervart, "Ideology and Christianity in Japan", *Social Science Japan Journal* 13/2, 2010, 258-261; Chris Thornhill, *A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, 88-111.
  - 17 Anthony Gill, "Religion and Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science* 4/1, 2001, 117-138.
  - 18 P. Norris – R. Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular...*, 25-274.
  - 19 Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, Oxford: Basic Books 1960, 47-101; Rodney Stark, "Reconceptualizing Religion, Magic, and Science", *Review of Religious Research* 43/2, 2001, 101-120.
  - 20 Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom – Gizem Arikan, "Religion and Support for Democracy: A Cross-National Test of the Mediating Mechanisms", *British Journal of Political Science* 43/2, 2013, 375-397: 23.
  - 21 Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'", *Journal of Democracy* 16/2, 2005, 13-27; Alfred C. Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations'", *Journal of Democracy* 11/4, 2000, 37-57.

also results from the fact that religiosity manifests itself in three basic dimensions: belief, behaviour and belonging,<sup>22</sup> and these dimensions interact with each other in different ways. In Poland, for example, Roman Catholicism is suspected to promote intolerant attitudes, although scientific studies do not confirm such a simple correlation. Therefore, it cannot be assumed in advance that religiosity will or will not be a factor supporting democratic attitudes. Instead, each case should be treated individually and studied thoroughly.

These first assumptions about the relationship between religion and politics were the inspiration for us to engage in the research presented in this paper. In the first stage of research, we attempted to diagnose the internal diversification of the segment of people self-identifying as Roman Catholics and to outline the discovered differences between them in the form of models of religious functioning in Poland. Religious functioning is understood as the way of life, wherein religion is attributed a certain level of impact on individual decisions, behaviours and attitudes. Then, we analysed the relations between the diagnosis-based models and the respondents' desired socio-political order in Poland. Our analysis was guided by expectations about the impact of the model of religious functioning on the desired socio-political order, which may refer in different ways to the needs and values generated within a religious community.

## 1. Specifics of Catholicism in Poland

The specific role of Christianity in Poland is associated not only with more than a thousand years' history of communion between religion and state (in the year 966, the prince of Poland Mieszko I adopted Christianity as the official religion in the country), but also with contemporary events. The first of the more recent factors is the more than fifty years of communism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Poland, with the totalitarian political system imposed by the USSR, eliminating religion from the public domain. During this period, the Roman Catholic Church, despite various repressions, was the carrier of the idea of freedom and resistance to totalitarianism. The situation is quite specific, because in other communist countries the Roman Catholic Church was much weaker.<sup>23</sup> This resulted partly either from their multi-religiousness (the co-existence of many denominations without any of them being dominant), or even from a social

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22 Marie Cornwall – Stan L. Albrecht – Perry H. Cunningham – Brian L. Pitcher, "The Dimensions of Religiosity: A Conceptual Model with an Empirical Test", *Review of Religious Research* 27/3, 1986, 226-244.

23 Melanie Tatur, "Catholicism and Modernization in Poland", *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 7/3, 1991, 335-349.

structure with most of the society declaring themselves to be atheists. Unlike in West European non-democratic countries in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Spain or Portugal), the Roman Catholic Church in Poland openly defied non-democratic authorities, which had a significant impact on its strength after the democratic breakthrough.

Another element affecting the role of Roman Catholicism in Polish society was the course of systemic transformation in Poland. The peaceful transition from communism to democracy was possible in part thanks to the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church, which supported the circles of democratic opposition and was an active mediator during the negotiation of consecutive phases and the course of democratisation processes. Especially the moderate wing of the Polish Episcopate was an important medium seeking compromises between the representatives of the regime and the Solidarity (*Solidarność*) movement.<sup>24</sup> This undoubtedly had an impact on the social and religious socialisation of citizens born after the overthrow of communism.<sup>25</sup>

The systemic transformation itself had some consequences for the Church – Polish society became open to the trends occurring in Western countries, including laicisation and secularisation.<sup>26</sup> This caused some cracks in the previously coherent religious structure of Roman Catholics in Poland, revealing often extreme stratification of attitudes. On the one hand, a conservative movement developed, concentrated around the Redemptorist priest Tadeusz Rydzyk and the media associated with him (e.g. the radio station *Maryja*, television station *Trwam*, and newspaper *Nasz Dziennik*), and stressing the need to secure the institutional and financial interests of the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, the movement of Roman Catholic integration supporters has sought contacts with representatives of other religions and emphasised the need to critically review the difficult history of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland (e.g. supporting the extermination of Jews during WWII or hiding paedophile scandals nowadays).

An important event affecting the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was the appointment of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as the pope, henceforth known as John Paul II. This took place in 1978 when the communist regime and the Cold War between the East and the West were flourishing. His assuming the function of the head of all Roman Catholics definitely strengthened the position of the Polish Roman Catholic Church, including

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24 M. Meyer Resende, *Catholicism and Nationalism...*, 35.

25 Tim S. Müller – Nan Dirk De Graaf – Peter Schmidt, “Which Societies Provide a Strong Religious Socialization Context? Explanations beyond the Effects of National Religiosity”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53/4, 2014, 739-759.

26 P. Norris – R. Inglehart, *Sacred and secular...*, 94-130.

in its internal relations with communist activists. The pope's official visits to Poland provided stimuli for great public demonstrations against communist authorities, expressing support for nationalistic ideas, the Solidarity movement and Lech Wałęsa.

After the collapse of communism, divisions occurred within the Roman Catholic Church concerning the interpretation of John Paul II's teachings. The line of division was associated with social and political issues. The first interpretation was that of the fundamentalists, who could read support for their demands of return to the conditions before the Second Vatican Council in John Paul II's conservative opinions concerning euthanasia, *in vitro* fertilisation, or turning a blind eye to the problem of paedophilia in the Church. The reformers, in turn, drew on the political proposals by referring to, for example, the thoughts included in the encyclical *Laborem Exercens*, clearly socio-democratic and economically anti-liberal. Later, the issue of Polish accession to the European Union became another line of division. While John Paul II supported those aspirations many times, the conservative element of Polish Catholics were clearly against European integration, seeing it as a danger both to the Roman Catholic Church and national sovereignty.<sup>27</sup>

A relatively homogeneous structure developed in Polish society in terms of religion and nationality due to its history and natural social interactions occurring in the period of formation of the democratic state. According to a study carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) in January 2012, 93.1% of the respondents identified themselves as members of the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>28</sup> The most recent study, from 2015, shows that 56% of Poles have "unfailing faith in God".<sup>29</sup> Only 4% of the respondents are unable to decide whether or not God exists and do not believe it is possible to verify this. And only 3% of the respondents say they do not believe in God at all. Despite the high homogeneity of Polish society regarding self-declared religious identity, in-depth studies show a kind of inconsistency. The analysis of the relation between faith in God and participation in religious practices reveals quite a clear and surprising dependence. It turns out that among those who believe in God and have no doubts about his existence, one fifth (20%) either do not practice their re-

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27 Agnieszka Turska-Kawa – Waldemar Wojtasik, "Religiosity and Electoral Participation: The Case of Poland", *Studia Methodologica* 38, 2014, 6-23.

28 Janusz Mariański, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce w przestrzeni życia publicznego*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2013; CBOS, "Społeczne postawy wobec wyznawców różnych religii" [online], *Komunikat z badań CBOS* BS/130/2012, <[http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2012/K\\_130\\_12.PDF](http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2012/K_130_12.PDF)>, [22 June 2017], 8.

29 CBOS, "Kanon wiary Polaków" [online], *Komunikat z badań CBOS* NR 29/2015, <[http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K\\_029\\_15.PDF](http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_029_15.PDF)>, [22 June 2017], 10.

ligion or do so only occasionally. On the other hand, two fifths of those who “sometimes have doubts about the existence of God” (44%), one fourth of those who “sometimes believe in God and sometimes do not” (26%), and every tenth “not believing in a personal God but in a supreme force” (10%) report engaging in religious practices at least once a week. Despite Poles’ strong belief in God and quite common observance of Easter, i.e. celebrating the mystery of the resurrection, only slightly more than one third of the respondents (36%) are convinced that “after death we will go, depending on our conduct on Earth, to heaven, hell, or purgatory”.<sup>30</sup>

These and other paradoxes, revealing an internally diversified structure within an apparently homogeneous society, have stimulated us to carry out the research described in this article. As outlined in the introduction, we have tried to verify the internal coherence of the segment of the population declaring themselves to be Roman Catholics, and to determine – on the basis of potential differences between Catholics – the models of religious functioning in Poland. Then, in a later phase of the study, we analysed the relationships between our models and the respondents’ desired socio-political order in the country.

## 2. Methods

*Participants and procedure.* The study was conducted between February and April 2014 among Poles who reported being Roman Catholics. The sample included 840 persons (472 women and 368 men).<sup>31</sup> The questionnaires were filled in only by adults with the right to vote. The sample was selected using quota stratified sampling. Stratification involved complete and disjoint division of the population into urban and rural residents (516 urban residents and 324 rural residents), and the quota procedure referred to sex, age and place of residence (town/village).

*Research tool.* The study involved a questionnaire whose items allowed the diagnosis of variables of key importance for the designed research process: the desired socio-political order and religious functioning. The respondents’ preferences concerning the socio-political order of the state

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30 *Ibid.*

31 983 questionnaires were distributed, and 840 of them were completed with respondents declaring themselves Roman Catholics. The sampling was both quota and stratified. Provinces were the strata, while quota sampling referred to sex, age and place of residence (town/village). The survey was carried out by trained pollsters. The study was financed by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Silesia in Katowice.

were diagnosed using an instrument designed by Urszula Jakubowska.<sup>32</sup> The technique involves five statements made by different politicians and published in the Polish press (the publications *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Ład*, and *Polityka*). Four of these messages reflected different colloquial understandings of the concept of democracy identified by Janusz Reykowski (namely the welfare state, democratic institutions, axiological democracy, and the ideological state).<sup>33</sup> The fifth statement also referred to the state system mentioned by Reykowski, but to a system based on authoritarian rules. The selected messages reflect theoretical assumptions about the particular ways of understanding socio-political order (see Table 1).

<b>Interpretations of the concept of socio-political orders and the definition criteria</b>	<b>Ways of presenting socio-political orders in political messages</b>
<p>“Welfare state” – the function of the state is to care for the majority of the people</p>	<p><u>Message: “Protective Order”</u> “The greatest problem of the democratic system is <i>how an ordinary citizen will do</i> in the new social and political order. What can I say to the elderly, ill, unfitting and weak ones? <i>Social demands should be transformed into tasks: we should build a new system of insurances, pensions, education and health care, reduce inflation, unemployment and show people some perspectives for the future.</i>”</p>
<p>“Ideological State” – faith, the Catholic Church, and national values are of overriding importance for the determination of one’s national identity</p>	<p><u>Message: “Nationalistic and Catholic Order”</u> “I think <i>the Catholic teaching most fully allows to accumulate and best utilise Poles’ internal power to create, develop and manage their own country. We should also care about political and economic independence of the country: eliminate the spy activity in the territory of Poland, resist the plans of the International Monetary Fund, and limit the establishment of companies with foreign capital, so as not to become a colony of another country.</i>”</p>

32 Urszula Jakubowska, *Preferencje polityczne: Psychologiczne teorie i badania*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN 1999, 134-135.

33 Janusz Reykowski, “Subiektywne znaczenie pojęcia demokracja a ujmowanie rzeczywistości politycznej”, in: id. (ed.), *Potoczne wyobrażenia o demokracji: Psychologiczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IP 1995, 19-66; id., „Poziom politycznego myślenia a rozwiązywanie społecznych zadań koordynacyjnych”, *Czasopismo Psychologiczne* 2, 1996, 7-29.

Interpretations of the concept of socio-political orders and the definition criteria	Ways of presenting socio-political orders in political messages
<p>“Axiological Democracy” – liberal values, especially each individual’s freedom of self-actualisation, are the foundation of a democratic state</p>	<p>Message: “<u>Liberal and Capitalistic Order</u>” “Only a community of <i>free people</i> can build a democratic order. <i>Living on one’s own, autonomy in decision-making, as well as individuals’ responsibility and courage</i> are the basic conditions of the development of democracy. <i>Widespread private ownership, local self-governments, and close cooperation with other nations</i> determine the value of the democratic order.”</p>
<p>“Institutional Democracy” – democracy is based on efficient functioning of democratic institutions (e.g. independent judiciary, free elections, no censorship)</p>	<p>Message: “<u>Democratic Institutions Order</u>” “I am of the opinion that we still need a kind of <i>agreement</i> regulating several basic issues, such as: <i>constitution, the mode of organising elections</i>, behaviours towards state entrepreneurs, old age or invalidity pensioners, and the public domain. This should be <i>a pact of the main political powers</i>, agreed so that its violation automatically eliminates one from politics. For the development of democracy, <i>political pluralism, no censorship, independent courts, and a clear division of competences of the president, government, Sejm</i> [i.e. the lower house of the Polish parliament], <i>and senate</i> are important.”</p>
<p>“Authoritarian State” – the functioning of the state is based on citizens’ submission to authority, whose role is to provide order and security</p>	<p>Message: “<u>Strong Law Order</u>” “In the country, <i>law is more important</i> than a temporary will of the majority, which – organised in self-governments or trade unions – only think about protecting their group interests. <i>Only strong law can guarantee order and effective ruling of the country. Law which is the outcome of experts’ work</i>, not of public consultations. The current law is imperfect and only <i>obedience</i> to the Christian rules prevents us from breaking it.”</p>

**Tab. 1.** Political messages characterising individual socio-political orders in the state.

Source: U. Jakubowska, *Preferencje polityczne...*, 134-135.

The respondents were informed that the five statements came from the electoral campaigns of five candidates in the 2011 parliamentary election in Poland. The identities of the politicians or their parties were not provided. The participants were asked to mark the political messages that, in their opinion, made the speaker the most suitable candidate for parliament.

The second part of the research instrument included 32 original statements formulated by the authors of this study on the basis of a pilot study

(N=380) and the peer group method. The questions asked about the role of religion in the respondents' lives and their engagement in religious practices. The respondents used a Likert scale with five answers to choose from: "strongly agree", "agree", "hard to say", "disagree", "strongly disagree".

The instrument also included a demographics section with variables such as sex, place of residence, education, perceived material standing, and age. We also included a question about political preferences, operationalised with the declarative question: "If the parliamentary elections took place this Sunday, which party would you vote for?" The range of responses that the respondents could choose from included all political parties active in Poland (inside the *Sejm*) and the response "other". The question was asked because the position of religion and the Roman Catholic Church is one of the basic planes of political discourse in Poland.

*Research questions.* The assumptions and relationships between the variables described above led to the formulation of four research questions guiding the empirical analyses:

- 1) What is the internal diversification of the segment of people declaring themselves to be Roman Catholics in Poland?
- 2) Does belonging to a certain model of religious functioning in Poland generate a preference for a specific socio-political order in the state?
- 3) Are models of religious functioning significantly correlated to socio-demographic variables?
- 4) Are models of religious functioning significantly correlated to the preference for political parties currently active in Poland?

### 3. Results

In the first stage of the research process, 32 items referring to the respondents' religious functioning were subject to an explanatory factor analysis. The goal was to find coherent structures in the set of random variables which would reflect internally homogeneous models. The principal axis factor analyses with Varimax rotation were performed. Both analyses revealed a three-factor structure. All factors had eigenvalues greater than 1. The models explained 59% of the total variance. The three-factor structure is presented in Table 2.

Item no.	Items	Factors		
		1	2	3
1	Ecumenism is the appropriate form of Christians getting closer to each other.	<b>.713</b>	.402	.076
2	Tolerance for other denominations is the basis for the Roman Catholic doctrine.	<b>.670</b>	.380	.070
3	The pontificate of Pope Francis provides hope for getting closer to the Orthodox Church.	<b>.745</b>	.232	.109
4	Faith is a private thing of each person.	<b>.607</b>	.374	.143
5	Non-believers should receive constant support from the Roman Catholic Church.	.008	.109	.032
6	The Roman Catholic Church should rather reward than punish its faithful.	.011	.121	.102
7	In general elections it is no problem for me to vote for a person who is not a Roman Catholic.	<b>.700</b>	.306	.043
8	Other denominations should have their representatives in the state authorities.	.387	<b>.711</b>	.044
9	Homosexual marriages should be legal.	<b>.623</b>	.398	.032
10	Consensus is fundamental for making political decisions.	<b>.700</b>	.294	.131
11	All people have the same rights.	.303	<b>.789</b>	.011
12	Different religions believe in the same God.	.032	.013	.007
13	Praying in churches of other denominations is acceptable.	<b>.583</b>	.023	.051
14	Sharing church services with other religions is acceptable.	<b>.644</b>	.354	.036

Item no.	Items	Factors		
		1	2	3
15	Everybody who declares to be a Roman Catholic is a member of our Church.	<b>.704</b>	.340	.314
16	The Roman Catholic Church should equally care for the believers and non-believers.	.304	<b>.601</b>	.102
17	The rulers should apply the will of God as they rule.	.045	.321	<b>.764</b>
18	Power is authorised by God.	.051	.209	<b>.708</b>
19	Those elected in general elections should swear on the Bible.	.222	.239	<b>.678</b>
20	The clergy should be allowed to run for general elections.	.318	.239	<b>.722</b>
21	A clergyman might become the president of Poland.	.106	.310	<b>.785</b>
22	Public authorities should be obliged to participate in religious celebrations.	.320	.151	<b>.605</b>
23	The Church should be subsidised by the state.	-.126	.217	<b>.819</b>
24	Religion-based schools should be established in Poland.	.150	.108	<b>.787</b>
25	Participation in religious rites is the most important expression of faith.	.102	<b>.642</b>	.334
26	Religious symbols should be present in public places.	.100	<b>.712</b>	.419
27	The clergy should be allowed to adjudicate in courts.	.079	.280	.227
28	Religion should be a mandatory school subject.	.362	.284	<b>.622</b>
29	Health care should be based on hospitals run by the Church.	.092	.163	.328
30	Roman Catholic Church catechism should be the core curriculum at schools.	.144	.307	<b>.808</b>
31	I would ban the promotion of atheism.	.053	.267	<b>.632</b>
32	Polish integration with the EU is a danger for Roman Catholicism.	.122	.042	<b>.809</b>

**Tab. 2.** The results of principal axis factor analyses with Varimax rotation.

### 3.1. Dimensions of religious functioning

An explanatory factor analysis showed a three-factor structure of the analysed set. Within it, we can identify three internally coherent groups, which represent three different models of religious functioning in Poland. Statements no. 5, 6, 12, 27, and 29 were not included in the analysis, as they did not demonstrate any significant relations with the factors. The first factor focuses on statements referring to the *closing – opening* dimension. This division is moderated by the primary function of religion, and can be articulated by the question whether Roman Catholicism should be the religion of the chosen ones (e.g. races, nations, or countries) or, the other way round, is egalitarian and available for everybody. Individuals situated at the first extreme are convinced of a highly exclusive character of religion, which determines attitudes based on claims that one needs to have some special characteristics to be a Roman Catholic. It narrows the group of potential Roman Catholics to those whose qualities enable them to really participate in faith. Roman Catholics at the other extreme recognise that the Roman Catholic religion is open to all people. It should treat all equally, in accordance with its basic principles, regardless of the denomination, beliefs or attitudes of others. This view is reflected in the individuals' attitudes which make them tolerant and full of acceptance for other religions coexisting with Roman Catholicism and its believers. Faith and the conviction about the significance of the Roman Catholic paradigm in one's life do not translate into aversion to people of other religions. This attitude is highly inclusive; it seeks the possibility of extensive penetration of other religions by Roman Catholicism. People situated at this extreme do not perceive others as good (namely Roman Catholics, following the principles of Roman Catholicism) or bad (those who do not).

The second factor refers to the degree of embedding of Roman Catholicism in the political and social system. Its basic dimension is the *clericalisation – secularisation* dyad. People who endorse the first extreme subscribe to the clerical formation. They would like to popularise religion in the secular sphere regulated by non-religious law, guaranteeing a favourable position to believers over non-believers. At the same time, they treat Roman Catholicism as the highest regulator of social behaviours, whose demands must be reflected in the existing system of norms applying to everyone. Those inclined towards the other approach would welcome institutional separation of the religious sphere in the public domain and ensuring religious neutrality towards state institutions. The institutions should serve all citizens equally, irrespective of their religion or world-views. Their faith is reflected in the need for public demonstrations on the ground of religious rituals in a community, making religion a sphere of

internal experience. They also seek after new forms of religious activity which fundamentalist clergy do not approve of.


The third factor takes into account the Roman Catholics' perception of their religion. Its spectrum is located within the *dogmatism – permissiveness* dimension. The dogmatic approach declares the need for a world order in accord with literally understood canons of Roman Catholicism. It manifests the need to base the operation of secular institutions on the principles and rules worked out by the Roman Catholic religion. In the dogmatic point of view, the conservative approach is dominant, demanding strict observance of the principles of faith and imposing them on people who do not share it. The stance on the other extreme proposes a critical attitude towards the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and the dogmas of faith. The permissive point of view questions religious values and all the norms that impose them on citizens. Its sources can be found in the process of changes occurring around (and within) the Church (connected, for example, with the attitudes of Pope Francis, such as shifting Church teaching on social affairs, or tolerance for other denominations), individualisation of social attitudes (especially among the youth), and the proposed need to adapt to new circumstances (e.g. globalisation of labour resources, migration).

### 3.2. Models of religious functioning

The second stage of the analysis aimed at the diagnosing the internal diversity of Roman Catholics in Poland in terms of relationships between the above-mentioned factors. For this purpose, cluster analysis with two-stage cluster sampling was used. This method allows the classification of natural clusters within a set of data. We obtained three clusters classified on the basis of the participants' responses. The model fit the data well (Silhouette coefficient = .5). Individual clusters included the following number of people: cluster 1 – 344 (41%), cluster 2 – 218 (26%), cluster 3 – 278 (33%). Cluster profiles are presented in Figure 1.

Comparison of clusters, made possible thanks to cluster analysis with two-stage cluster sampling, shows that the contents of two clusters are similar and the third one contrasts with them. Cluster 1 focuses on individuals who believe in the fundamental role of religion in building the social and political life of the country. This point of view is based on the dogmatic paradigm, which involves translating religious laws into the social and political spheres. The anticipated model of social relationships is based on the existence of religious premises in all the areas of the state as an organisation, treating political authority as the emanation of God's will. People elected for political positions should swear on the Bible, and the

highest offices in the state should be available for the clergy. Representatives of this perspective demonstrate low tolerance of other religions and non-believers. They do not recognise any equality in the matter of religion; they divide people into good (Roman Catholics) and bad (all the others). They support popularisation of religion in the secular domain and aim at a world order in which the principles and norms of the Roman Catholic religion would have primacy. This could be achieved via popularisation of religion-based schools, where the catechism of the Roman Catholic Church would be the core curriculum. The persons within cluster 1 perceive Polish integration with the European Union as a threat to Roman Catholicism, and demand a ban on promoting atheism.



**Fig. 1.** Cluster profiles in religious functioning models obtained with cluster analysis using two-stage cluster sampling.

Clusters 2 and 3 are much closer to each other and relatively opposed to cluster 1. They differ in regard to the level of strictness in certain factors. Cluster 2 includes people who represent a very high level of openness regarding faith and social equality. The social paradigm, in which religion is a medium of social engagement, is important for them. They do not have an isolationist attitude and they do not disagree with observing rules other than those of Roman Catholicism, which is a qualitative difference from cluster 1. For them, religion is an instrument for creating a community and including others in it, and they treat other Christians as “brothers”. They

promote ecumenism and perceive the pontificate of Pope Francis as an opportunity to get closer to other Christians.

For persons in cluster 3, the institutional paradigm seems much more significant. This paradigm involves seeing religion as a factor which links society with the political system. Therefore, social changes require the adaptation of religious principles, since this is the only way to achieve social coherence. They are open-minded regarding faith and positioned rather close to the “opening” extreme, but they are for adapting the static norms and rules which regulate the community of Roman Catholics. The adoption of an “equality attitude” involves both social and political components. An example of the first of them is acceptance of the legalisation of homosexual marriages (which is opposed by the representatives of the Roman Catholic hierarchy). The political component is reflected in the demand for consensus as the basis for making political decisions. Thus, cluster 3 involves a departure from treating Roman Catholicism dogmatically, instead taking the interests of representatives of other religions or non-believers into consideration.

On the basis of comparison of the factors and their internal structure, the clusters were given the following names: fundamentalists, inclusionists, and protesters, respectively. *Fundamentalists* (41%) are the most uncompromising Roman Catholics of all the identified groups. Their view of the world is shaped by the principles and norms of the Roman Catholic religion. According to fundamentalists, a secular state cannot exist: not only do they approve of the overlapping of the sacred and the secular, but they also support the dominance of the Roman Catholic religion in the socio-political domain. Religion should be the regulator of social relations. Their understanding of religion determines their view of socio-political problems. They are not willing to cooperate with people of other religions or with non-believers. The need to impose their own religious views and dogmas, or the perception of their own beliefs as superior to others’ beliefs, is dominant. Fundamentalists are against any changes in the Roman Catholic Church; they can even express their disagreement with the evolution of social teachings proposed by Pope Francis. This group seems to have been greatly shaped by the pontificate of John Paul II, whose views and teachings were highly conservative. The figure of John Paul II was an embodiment of the Pole-Catholic ideal, which for them is a combination of the national and religious elements.

*Inclusionists* (26%) would like to broaden the circle of Roman Catholics, but by positive incentives. They base their behaviour on the rules of Roman Catholicism, but they also have a high level of tolerance for people who follow different canons of rules. Ecumenism is a characteristic approach towards people of other Christian religions; they are open

to the possibility of sharing religious experiences. They are not supporters of the institutionalisation of religion in the public domain, concentrating instead on the exploration of religious attitudes in the private sphere. For them, the religious affiliation of electoral candidates is not the factor conditioning their support for them; they may vote for candidates belonging to other religions.


*Protesters* (33%) are Roman Catholics who seek a new institutional sphere for the Roman Catholic religion. They do not contest its principles but they think that some of its regulations are no longer valid due to the advancement of civilisation, and they therefore need to be adapted to the new socio-political conditions. They point out that the Roman Catholic Church has changed the canons of its teaching many times in history, adapting them to social changes. Unlike inclusionists who stress the private nature of religion, protesters point out the need for an institutionalised change. It would occur both at the level of dogmas of faith (e.g. belief in the same God among different Christian groups) and social demands (e.g. the possibility of legalisation of homosexual marriages). For the protesters, anyone who self-identifies as Roman Catholic is one, even without meeting the formal criteria according to Church teaching.

All the comparisons of socio-demographic variables showed statistically significant differences between cluster groups. The comparison of education level ( $U=26.257$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $p<.001$ ) showed that fundamentalists have a lower education than the other groups. Reported material standing is worse among fundamentalists than among inclusionists and protesters ( $U=13.126$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $p=.001$ ). The group of protesters is characterised by lower age in comparison with fundamentalists and inclusionists ( $U=12.278$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $p<.001$ ), and fundamentalists, by higher age than in the case of inclusionists and protesters ( $U=9.384$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $p=.001$ ).

As a part of the research procedure, we verified the structure of identification of Roman Catholics belonging to particular models with political parties operating on the Polish political scene. We found that among those who declared support for Law and Justice (PiS), fundamentalists were the most numerous group ( $U=10.234$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.002$ ). Among the followers of Civic Platform (PO), inclusionists were the most numerous ( $U=12.423$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.001$ ). Similarly, the supporters of the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) had the strongest representation among inclusionists ( $U=19.435$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p<.001$ ). As for Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) voters, they included the greatest number of protesters ( $U=13.765$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

### 3.3. Models of religious functioning and socio-political orders

In the last phase of the research procedure we verified support for the proposed socio-political orders in Poland for each of the identified groups, based on the assumption that the model of religious functioning would be reflected in the declaration of order desired in the country. Figure 2 presents the percentage of responses given by persons from each group.



**Fig. 2.** Fundamentalists', inclusionists', and protesters' perceptions of socio-political orders in Poland (%).

For fundamentalists, the Nationalistic and Catholic Order proved to be most important (80%). It involves the dominance of religious order over the secular; however, it does not deny the existence of these two spheres but rather assumes their unequal coexistence. Those who prefer this order are mostly of the opinion that religious values and norms should regulate not only the sphere of the sacred but also have an overriding importance for the secular. Fundamentalists do not attach great importance to the other orders; their preference for them accounts for only a few per cent.

More than half of inclusionists fully support a politician related to the Protective Order (51%). It is clear in this case that those in this category consistently promote the equality of all people regardless of religion. This order emphasises the citizen's subjectivity, with a clear focus on social welfare. Every fifth inclusionist (19%) expressed preference for the Democratic Institutions Order, which means that in socio-political life

these people attribute a significant role to the efficient functioning of the secular domain, which can ensure proper relationships within a country. The other orders are supported at the level of approximately 10%.

Protesters are the group for which it is very difficult to clearly identify one dominant order. Every third believer in this group prefers the Protective Order (36%), and every fourth, the Democratic Institutions Order (26%). For protesters, then, both the equality of citizens and efficient regulation of the socio-political order by democratic institutions are highly significant. Interestingly, this group displays relatively high support for the Nationalistic and Catholic Order (17%). It seems that this result demonstrates the processes of departure from uncompromising dogmas of faith and adapting to the new socio-political contexts. Perhaps this group – long attached to religion and nationalistic state models – by watching civilisation processes all over the world, concludes that the Catholic Church has reached the point when altering the canons of faith is necessary to adjust to contemporary changes. Therefore, there are some discrepancies within the group regarding the direction of socio-political reforms and the preferred orders. This finding definitely calls for more thorough study, perhaps carried out in a longer time frame. It would be interesting to investigate whether, in several years, protesters' support for the Protective Order and Democratic Institutions Order will grow and support for the Nationalistic and Catholic Order will decrease, or whether they will return to the order in which the Catholic Church and nationalistic values play the primary role in establishing their own conception of the state.

#### **4. Discussion and conclusions**

The research presented in this article involved four research questions. Two research tools were used to find answers to these questions. The statements included in the first of them referred to the religious functioning of Roman Catholics in Poland. We wanted to find out the place of religion as a regulator of individual behaviours and the preferred socio-political order and its relations with institutional regulators. Exploratory factor analysis showed that the items presented in the instrument can be grouped into three coherent factors: “closing – opening”, “clericalisation – secularisation” and “dogmatism – permissiveness”. In the second phase of the research process, cluster analysis with two-stage cluster sampling allowed us to identify three groups of Roman Catholics with different relations within the dimensions determined using factor analysis: fundamentalists, inclusionists, and protesters. This provided the answer to the first research question concerning the internal diversity of Roman Catholics in Poland.

Empirical findings showed that generally there are three models of co-existence of religious and secular orders in Poland. The first of them – mostly represented by fundamentalists – regards religious principles as superior to the principles resulting from a non-religious system of values. The two remaining models indicate the attitude that these two spheres can cooperate. The second model – mostly represented by inclusionists – highlights the social justice factor: equality of all people, regardless of their religion. The third model – mostly represented by protesters – stresses the need to adapt the social teachings of the Church to changing socio-political contexts.

The second research question reflected our search for relations between those categorized according to our models of religious functioning in Poland and respondents' preferences for a specific type of socio-political order. The outcome clearly proves strong relations between the models of religious functioning and socio-political ordering. The categories of socio-political order represent different beliefs about the proper relations between authorities and citizens, a slightly different perception of democracy and its institutions, and the position of national values in the state. The analysis shows that different socio-political orders may adequately respond to the needs of people functioning differently in the religious domain. Fundamentalists consistently support the primacy of religion in the process of the development of national identity, which is present in the Nationalistic and Catholic Order. The other orders are only occasionally chosen by this group. The Protective Order, chosen by more than half of inclusionists as most desirable, involves the orientation of the authorities toward each citizen and the providing of protection to citizens against groups of vested interests. Such a socio-political orientation is consistent with the demands of inclusionists, since this group expresses strong positive attitudes towards ecumenism and orientation towards all members of the religious community, not only those who believe in the canon of Roman Catholic rules. Hence, in this set of attitudes there is a considerable element of equality, expressed as ecumenism. These Roman Catholics also have a relatively high regard for the Democratic Institutions Order, which reflects their approval of efficient functioning of democratic institutions in accordance with secular rules. Protesters also support these two orders, although in slightly different proportions. Protesters, moreover, put more emphasis on the institutional issues, looking for distinct institutional areas available for the Roman Catholic religion. For both inclusionists and protesters, the separation of the secular and religious spheres is clear, and these models are an expression of looking for appropriate opportunities for these spheres to coexist efficiently.

An interesting outcome of the study is the generally weak support in all the studied Catholic groups for two socio-political orders: the Strong State Order and the Liberal and Capitalistic Order. The former is based on the principle of citizens' obedience to authorities, which is supposed to ensure order and safety. The latter is supposed to ensure liberty for citizens, a democratic space for individuals' self-actualisation. These two orders oppose each other in terms of citizens' activity and personal responsibility. The former grants responsibility to authorities, while the latter fully hands it over to citizens. This seems to be the result of the historical determinants of democracy in Poland. Until 1989, Poland was not a sovereign state; it had been dominated by the USSR. It was ruled by the communist Polish Workers Party, later called the Polish United Workers Party, with some formal satellite entities. In the People's Republic of Poland, human rights were violated, including the freedom of speech, press, opinion, conscience, and religion. Citizens' liberty was limited in almost every field of the social sphere. Memories of that period definitely contribute to the low support for the Strong State Order, which reflects the assumptions of the previous system. It may also be the result of the fear of oppression of religious rights by the strong state and its political institutions.

But in fact, the Liberal and Capitalistic Order, which guarantees the individual's freedom, is not approved by any of the groups, either. It can be supposed that this finding confirms a kind of "escape from freedom"<sup>34</sup> in which citizens on the one hand miss freedom whenever it is oppressed, but once it is achieved, they are unable to take personal responsibility for their behaviour and miss a system that strictly regulates it. As Erich Fromm observed, freedom requires courage. Freedom is the effort to fight one's drives, it is a condition that needs to be strengthened all the time. Individuals raised in a system that "talked" about freedom but did not "teach" it may have difficulty facing a situation in which they must take responsibility for themselves within a system that hands over the self-actualisation process to citizens.

Taking into consideration the strong value foundations of the fundamentalist, inclusionist and protester models and their consequent stability, we may suppose that in the foreseeable future Roman Catholicism in Poland will demonstrate a higher degree of adaptation to the changing socio-political contexts. As mentioned in the introduction, a large percentage of Polish citizens are Roman Catholics. The diagnosis presented in this article indicates that the internal structure of the Roman Catholic segment in Poland is not rigid. Out of the three models, the percentage of funda-

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34 Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York: Holt Paperbacks 1994 (1<sup>st</sup> Owl Books ed.).

mentalists is the highest, but taking into account the other two, we find that the majority of respondents are Roman Catholics who seek a certain compromise between the secular and religious orders both in the social and institutional domains. Thus, in Poland there are relatively more Roman Catholics who desire coexistence of the sacred and the secular and believe these spheres should fulfil their autonomous tasks and functions. In Poland the segment of fundamentalists is most visible in the media, but the results presented here show that its real influence may be weaker.

The above-mentioned prognosis is further justified by the fact that our study's models demonstrate significant relations among socio-demographic variables, which was the subject of the third research question. Among fundamentalists, people with lower education are the largest subset. Higher education facilitates the acceptance of democratic norms and values, and thus, understanding of the importance of one's own engagement in building a civic community. In many past studies, education was determined as the variable moderating social activity of citizens.<sup>35</sup> Knowledge acquired at consecutive stages of education allows for better understanding of the mechanisms governing the socio-political domain, provides broader perspectives for its analysis, and reduces the costs of social activity, enabling people to comprehend political dialogue.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, fundamentalists generally have a lower material status as compared to inclusionists or protesters. Lower than average material standing, just like other factors that weaken an individual's social status, may lead to a simplified way of perceiving the role of religion, causing the emphasis on extreme viewpoints in the expressed attitude.<sup>37</sup> The oldest persons dominate among fundamentalists, while protesters are usually the youngest. This fact may result from the formative role of the Roman Catholic Church, which grants

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- 35 E.g., Angus Campbell – Philip E. Converse – Warren E. Miller – Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley 1960, 12-48; Benjamin I. Page, "Election and Social Choice: The State of the Evidence", *American Journal of Political Science* 21/3, 1977, 639-668; Jacek Raciborski, "Zachowania wyborcze Polaków w warunkach zmiany systemu politycznego", in: id. (ed.), *Wybory i narodziny demokracji w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Warszawa: Scholar 1991, 42-59; Radosław Markowski, "Milcząca większość: O bierności politycznej społeczeństwa polskiego", in: Stanisław Gebethner – Jacek Raciborski (eds.), *Wybory '91 a polska scena polityczna*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Inicjatyw Społecznych "Polska w Europie" 1992, 57-86; Krzysztof Korzeniowski, "Jacy Polacy systematycznie odmawiają udziału w wyborach: Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska 'non-voter'", *Studia Psychologiczne* 1, 1994, 93-100.
- 36 Jean-Paul Willaime, "Religion in Ultramodernity", in: James A. Beckford – John Walliss (eds.), *Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2006, 77-89.
- 37 Michael McBride, "Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation: A Game Theoretic Analysis", *American Journal of Sociology* 114/1, 2008, 77-106.

elderly people with information whose acquisition might otherwise require greater resources and competence.<sup>38</sup> This may be evidence of changes which have occurred in society during the transformation period, when the younger generations have pluralised the sources of information and the elderly continue to rely on traditional media, including the Roman Catholic Church. It may also indicate that the younger are more open to change, resulting in greater open-mindedness and, consequently, greater criticism of Roman Catholicism in Poland.

The final research question focused on the relations between the models of religious functioning and the preference for particular political parties active in Poland. This task was interesting for at least two basic reasons. The first is the dynamic development of the party system in the country, subject to the processes of systemic transformation. Since 1989, when the first partially free parliamentary election took place, many ephemeral political parties have been created in Poland. It is only since 2007 that stabilisation and consolidation of the party system has been visible. The second reason is the significance of the sphere of religion and Roman Catholic dogmas in the programmes of some political parties, which *expressis verbis* refer to the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. The party preferences of Roman Catholics belonging to particular models allow us to see the relation between the identified groups of fundamentalists, inclusionists and protesters, the types of institutional order they prefer, and their declared party inclination.

In the study, fundamentalists proved to be mostly voters for the Law and Justice (PiS) party.<sup>39</sup> It is a conservative party with a Christian and nationalistic platform, directly including elements of Roman Catholic Church teachings in its programme. What is more, it is supported by a wide group of the highest Church hierarchs in Poland, who do not hesitate to endorse this party as the only representative in the political sphere. PiS is also supported by the conservative Roman Catholic media, whose representatives are placed on candidate lists in parliamentary elections. The basis for the political platform of PiS is the combination of national and religious issues. In the second case, it involves both ensuring the Roman Catholic Church a privileged role in the public domain and translating religious principles into the legal system, which is demonstrated in the Nationalistic and Catholic Order preferred by most fundamentalists.

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38 Kenneth M. Goldstein – Matthew Holleque, “Getting Up Off the Canvass: Rethinking the Study of Mobilization”, in: Jan E. Leighley (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*, New York: Oxford University Press 2010, 578-580.

39 In the election to the lower house of parliament in 2015, PiS obtained 37.58% of votes, PO 24.09%, SLD (and its coalition partners) 7.55%, and PSL 13%.

Some of their proposals are the same as regulations aimed at guaranteeing religious freedom drawn up in the USA – such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.<sup>40</sup> PiS supports the concordat with the Church as the basis for mutual relations between Poland and Vatican; that document (signed at the beginning of the systemic transformation) legally obliges the state to protect and finance the Roman Catholic Church. It also promotes the maintenance of a ban on abortion and *in vitro* procedures, and opposes the introduction of legal euthanasia into Polish law. Although the party does not clearly oppose the processes of Polish integration with the European Union, it demands the protection of national interests by approving only the necessary degree of implementation of EU accession solutions.

Inclusionists more often support the Civic Platform (PO) and Polish Peasants' Party (PSL). The policy proposals of these parties are naturally manifested in the Protective Order and the Democratic Institutions Order. PO is a Christian democratic party, which refers to tradition and religion but leaves those issues to the personal choice of the citizens. Neither the leaders nor people appointed to hold prominent positions in the government publicly emphasise their approach to issues connected with faith, although they obviously do not dissociate themselves from the Roman Catholic Church. The political platform of PO mainly includes social and economic issues, especially referring to the sense of community and responsibility for others. It is favourably inclined to European integration and demands strict separation between the sacred and the secular, which in Poland involves the position of the Roman Catholic Church. PSL is an agrarian party, receiving support from farmers and residents of villages and small towns. In its activity, it tries to represent these social groups, protecting their economic interests. That is why, unlike PO, it is anti-market, supporting the privileges of farmers and those who are economically excluded. Its main proposals include extending the state-subsidised pension system to cover farmers and their families, supporting subsidies for agricultural production and protecting the domestic market from imported goods. Religion and the Roman Catholic Church are the basic elements of the social order PSL prefers. Unlike PiS, the nationalistic element is not so strong here. Instead, the party is oriented towards local and regional structures, also in terms of religion. The local church and bishop are more important for PSL than the Vatican and the pope.

Protesters mostly prefer the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Protesters are the most diversified group regarding order preference. Each order re-

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40 Dave Bridge, "Religious Freedom or Libertarianism: What Explains State Enactments of Religious Freedom Restoration Act Laws?", *Journal of Church and State* 56/2, 2012, 347-369.



ceived support from at least 10% of the respondents. The strongest preference was given to the Protective Order and the Democratic Institutions Order, just as with inclusionists. SLD represents these views. It is a socio-democratic party, drawing on left-wing catchphrases and ideas, among which are the demands of separation between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. However, SLD and its most transparent public figures have not dissociated themselves from religion and faith, stressing their Roman Catholic upbringing in their life stories. This ideological dissonance makes it possible for SLD voters to refer to their own imaginations, which would be impossible if the party's ideological propositions were formulated precisely. This space allows for various types of orders, which is shown in the study. Regarding the three Polish parties mentioned earlier, SLD is the least ideologically straightforward, which definitely fosters the dispersion of attitudes.



## SUMMARY

**Diversity of Roman Catholics in Poland and Their Socio-Institutional Preferences**

The specific role of Roman Catholicism in Poland is associated both with over a thousand year's history of communion between religion and the state and with contemporary events, including, e.g., the collapse of communism, systemic transformation, and the selection of Karol Wojtyła as the pope. Because of these events, the sacred and secular spheres in Poland are not autonomous and often overlap. What is interesting, despite the commonly stressed religious homogeneity of Polish society, our research shows various internal paradoxes within that segment. This fact inspired us to carry out the presented research, aimed at verifying the internal coherence of the segment of people identifying as Roman Catholics, and at determining – on the basis of potential differences between them – the models of religious functioning in Poland. Due to the overlapping of the spheres of religion and politics in Polish history, we analysed the relations between the identified models and the desired types of socio-political order in the country. The analysis was influenced by anticipations concerning the impact of the model of religious functioning on the desired socio-political order in Poland, which may refer to the needs and values generated by the sphere of the sacred in different ways. Empirical findings show that generally in Poland there are three models of coexistence of the religious and secular orders: protesters, inclusionists, and fundamentalists. The outcome clearly proves the existence of strong relations between the models of religious functioning and the socio-political orders.

**Keywords:** Roman Catholicism; Poland; socio-political order; Polish Catholics; democratic attitudes.

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