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Unpacking the norms of Atticism: Impersonal modality and the negotiation of overt prestige in Atticist lexicographers

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Abstract

Though the Atticist lexica have often been seen as ‘codifying’ a prestige variety, there have been very few studies of the specific ways in which Atticist lexica linguistically establish and accord *overt prestige*, i.e. a higher perceived social status of language use as recognized explicitly within a community. Therefore, we demonstrate that impersonal deontic modal expressions (forms of $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ and $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$) are used by the Atticist lexicographers in three ways to record usage norms with overt prestige: (1) report norms with overt prestige (incl. via negative association with social groups), (2) construct norms with overt prestige, and (3) negotiate norms with overt prestige. Our findings attest to a significant diversity within Atticist lexicography with regard to overt prestige: Aelius Dionysius and Pausanias (based on the limited material) seem to almost exclusively report norms, whereas Phrynichus reports, constructs and negotiates norms, and the *Antiatticist* exclusively (re)negotiates norms.

Keywords

prescriptivism; Atticism; prestige; historical sociolinguistics; Post-Classical Greek

1 Unpacking the norms and prestige of linguistic Atticism

It is commonly agreed that Atticism has had a major impact on the history of Greek (Adrados 2005: p. 505). At the same time, we know that Atticism has had a rather complex history itself.¹ It seems to have started out as a tradition of stylistic Atticism linked exclusively to styles of rhetorical declamation (cf. the codification of styles by Dionysius of Halicarnassus), but in the second century CE became inextricably linked to linguistic prescriptivism. The latter is illustrated particularly well by the Atticist lexica, which determined which vocabulary, morphology and syntax to use (la Roi, 2022a). In fact, these prescriptivist lexica provide evidence for distinct differences in *prestige* between Post-Classical Greek varieties of language usage, that is, “the social evaluations that speakers attach to a language rather than to the characteristics of the language system as such” (Sairio & Palander-Collin 2012: p. 626). In the eyes of the Atticist lexica, one major source for determining the prestige of the language to use language is ancient authors, specific selections of which they present as linguistic models to follow whereas others are to be avoided (cf. Tribulato 2013; Huitink & Rood 2020; Roumanis & Benstein 2023). Still, there was no accepted contemporary standard in Post-Classical Greek against which specific subvarieties may be measured.² As a result, what was ‘accepted’ was very much still open to negotiation. In fact, it is exactly these prescriptivist lexica which seem to be the principal candidates for *negotiating* different, competing patterns of *overt* prestige in Post-Classical Greek, as they reflect openly on what is ‘accepted’ language.³ Overt prestige is a concept from the field of historical sociolinguistics which refers to the higher perceived social status of language use as recognized explicitly within a community (Yule 2010: p. 291; Milroy 2012). By contrast, covert prestige refers to “the status of a speech style or feature as having positive value, but which is “hidden” or not valued similarly among the larger community” (Yule 2010: pp. 285–286). We would like to suggest that focusing on *how* these lexica negotiate overt prestige might be more fruitful than placing them only within the larger realm of prescriptivism, especially because theories and practices of prescriptivism often depend on the notion of a standard against which other varieties are measured. Since there was no fully accepted standard language contemporary to these lexica (Clackson 2015), we thereby would avoid the risk of anachronistically projecting back ideas of prescriptivism as we know them from other periods, where there were institutionalized forms of standardization (e.g. academies, an accepted authority etc.), to post-classical times, where such institutionalized standardization was absent.⁴

1 See Kim (2010, 2017) for overviews.

2 cf. Clackson (2015: pp. 54–58) who also notes a contemporary codification of Koiné varieties in education.

3 See Sairio and Palander-Collin (2012: pp. 626–638) for an overview of historical sociolinguistic research into tracing prestige patterns in language history.

4 Cf. Bergs (2012) for this theoretical point about the potential of anachronicity in tracing social and societal processes in historical data.

Remarkably, though, there are very few studies that focus exclusively on the language used by the Atticist lexica to accord these forms of overt prestige. Of course, scholars have noted the prescriptive stance inherent in the formulation of the entries (e.g. Say X, not Y), but it seems that relatively few have explicitly compared and contrasted the evaluative language of the Atticist lexicographers itself (e.g. Kim 2017, Roumanis & Bentein 2023). One aspect of their normative language that we believe deserves further attention is the way that the Atticist lexicographers use specific linguistic strategies to express such seemingly accepted, overt prestige patterns.⁵ As illustrated by the following two examples, Atticist lexicographers use impersonal modal verbs to introduce those language usages which are seemingly accepted practice, i.e. a usage norm with overt prestige.

(1) Γρηγορῶ, γρηγορεῖ **οὐ δεῖ**· **χρή** γὰρ ἐγρήγορα **λέγειν** καὶ ἐγρήγορεν. (Phryn *Ec.* 88)

One ought not (say) *grēgorō*, [I am awake], *grēgorēi* [s/he is awake]; for **one ought to say** *egrēgora* [I am awake] and *egrēgoren* [s/he is awake]

(2) Ἀποκριθῆναι· διττὸν ἀμάρτημα, **ἔδει γὰρ λέγειν** ἀποκρίνασθαι, **καὶ εἰδέναι**, ὅτι τὸ διαχωρισθῆναι σημαίνει, ὡσπεροῦν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ, τὸ συγκριθῆναι, (τὸ) εἰς ἓν καὶ ταῦτὸν ἔλθειν. εἰδὼς οὖν τοῦτο ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνασθαι λέγε, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ διαχωρισθῆναι ἀποκριθῆναι. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 78)

Apokriθēnai [to answer]: double mistake, for he **ought to have said** *apokrinasthai* [to answer], **and known**, that it signifies being separated, as in fact also its reverse, being combined, the coming to one and the same. So know this and with returning the question say *apokrinasthai* [to answer], but with being separated *apokriθēnai* [to be separated].

At the same time, we say ‘seemingly’ accepted, since the Atticist lexicographers use different modal verbs (contrast *δεῖ* and *χρή* in example 1) to introduce competing patterns of usage (see *οὐ δεῖ* ‘one ought not [say X]’). Also, there is a crucial difference between example 1 and 2 in that *ἔδει λέγειν* expresses that the addressee did *not* do and know something that s/he should have, i.e. the modal verb is used counterfactually (cf. la Roi 2024). On the other hand, both examples share that the pattern with overt prestige is introduced by the lexicographer with the explanatory particle *γὰρ* ‘for’; in fact, example 2 subsequently spells out the basis for the overt prestige, i.e. some (implicit) grammatical norm is the basis for the overt prestige of one alternative. Thus, what these two examples, though briefly, illustrate is that the Atticist lexicographers are not just codifying a prestige language variety (as their role is commonly interpreted in histories of Greek⁶) but they are rather negotiating, challenging and accepting the overt prestige of usages.

In this article, we aim to unpack the different ways in which the different Atticist lexicographers do that, by analysing their use of a set of impersonal modal strategies to

5 Cf. van Ostade (2011) on the use of deontic modals by the prescriptivist grammarian Robert Lowth in his grammatical work on English.

6 Prescriptivists have taken this as far as to say that Atticism saved Greek, problematic views which have been discussed in la Roi (2022a: pp. 204–205).

that purpose (see 2.1 for an overview). The three main research questions that we aim to answer in this study are:

- (1) how do the Atticist lexicographers report linguistic norms with overt prestige?
- (2) how do the Atticist lexicographers negotiate patterns of overt prestige?
- (3) what are the most striking differences between the lexicographers in dealing with overt prestige?

The current study is based on an analysis of the following four lexicographers associated with linguistic Atticism: Aelius Dionysius, Phrynichus, Moeris, and the *Antiatticist*. Aelius Dionysius of Halicarnassus' lexicon, *Attic Words* (Ἀττικά ὀνόματα), along with Pausanias' *Collection of Attic words* (Ἀττικῶν ὀνομάτων συναγωγή), are notable for being the first (or at the very least, two of the first) of the Atticist lexica produced during the early second century (Dickey 2007: p. 99). Neither lexicon has survived intact, but fragments have come down to us as quotations in the Homeric commentaries of Eustathius, and also in various Atticist lexica of the Byzantine period (Matthaios 2015a: p. 292). We may assume that both of these lexica were extant, and influential amongst lexicographers in the Byzantine period, since Photius gave brief descriptions of both in his *Bibliotheca* (Aelius Dionysius: cod. 152, 99b20–40; Pausanias: cod. 153, 99b41–100a12); he recommends *Attic Words* as a χρησιμώτατος πόνος ('most useful work') for those wanting to write Attic correctly and familiarise themselves with the works of Attic writers, and *Collection of Attic Words* as an equally useful work, if not more so, than the former.⁷ Their content and tone differ from the lexica that Phrynichus and Moeris compiled later, resp. at the end of the second century and in the third century, in that they tend more toward description rather than prescription (Tosi 2015: p. 632), with Pausanias' work, according to Photius, containing more lemmata than Aelius Dionysius', but fewer illustrative examples. The fragments of both Aelius Dionysius' and Pausanias' lexica have been gathered and published in a single work by Erbse (1950: pp. 95–151), which remains the standard edition. We would hasten to add, though, that the edition, though generally accepted as standard, has not been received with unanimous approval, as for example shown in the critical review by Latte (1952). As a result, any evidence that can be taken from what Erbse takes to be earlier Atticist lexicographical evidence, should be approached with the highest degree of caution. This equally applies to the limited number of impersonal modal expressions in Aelius Dionysius and Pausanias discussed below.

At the end of the second century, with the model of the Atticist lexicon already established, Phrynichus (the lexicographer) produced two works of differing purpose and severity: the *Praeparatio Sophistica* (PS), a guide to (correct) Attic style, and the *Ecloga*, a dictionary-like manual of Attic forms. The former, arranged in an alphabetical order (by first word), has come down to us as an epitome; it is based on a broader selection of authors than the *Ecloga*, yet in its concise form does not always flag the specific source models from comedy, historiography, and rhetoric. The latter, which survives mostly

7 In addition, Photius himself draws from these sources in his lexicon as well.

intact, consists of two, non-alphabetised books (422 unique entries); the comments in Book One are typically more pithy, offering simpler oppositions between approved and censured forms, while in Book Two they tend more toward explication and referencing of literary models (Roumanis & Bentein, 2023: p. 7)—this Book was very likely Phrynichus' reply to the *Antiatticist*, which was probably itself a response to Book One of the *Ecloga* (Valente 2015: pp. 51–53), or possibly both (Fischer 1974). For the *PS*, Borries' work is the latest edition (von Borries 1911), while for the *Ecloga*, Fischer's (1974) edition remains standard, although Lobeck's (1820), and less so Rutherford's (1881), can still be useful.

The *Antiatticist*, a name coined by the scholar David Ruhkenius (1723–1798), and now conventionally used to refer to both the lexicon and its anonymous author, is a work that survives in epitomised form only in a single manuscript, with very few indirect witnesses (Valente 2015: p. 6). It is this excerpted form, along with the misleading title, that makes this work slightly more difficult to use than our other lexica. The anonymous author was not, in responding to Book One of the *Ecloga*, simply critiquing all other contemporary Atticists *tout court*, but also arguing for the admission of a wider range of forms to the Atticist canon based on their mere citation in Classical Attic literature (Dickey 2007: p. 97). It is this more general acceptance of Attic forms, reflected in its Alexandrine source material,⁸ that contrasts with Phrynichus' value-laden eclecticism. Indeed, the *Ecloga* is unique among Atticist lexica in the severity of its selection criteria; others, including the *PS*, follow Pollux's *Onomasticon* in taking attestation in the ancient literature as a basic criterion of acceptability (see Matthaios 2015a: pp. 294–296).⁹ For the *Antiatticist*, Valente's edition (2015) is now standard; we follow his alphanumeric lemmas when citing entries.

The other lexicon from which we have drawn our examples, is Moeris' *Atticist*. Various scholars have posited different dates for its composition. As Dickey (2007: p. 98) notes, based on his use of all Atticists that came before him, it is reasonable that the third century be considered a *terminus post quem*; Hansen suggests the fifth century as the latest possible date (Hansen 1998: p. 60). In terms of its content and structure, the *Atticist*, as we have it now of course, seems to be more crisp, offering the user simple lexical oppositions; the impersonal modal $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ is only used once to overtly mark a directive stance. The lexicon is overwhelmingly marked by a more objective bent that makes it less prescriptive than the *Ecloga*, yet not quite as admitting of different forms as the *Antiatticist*.¹⁰ The edition of Hansen (1998) is the standard one, though earlier works contain useful material.

8 See Valente (2015: pp. 31–42).

9 Also, Tosi (2013: pp. 144) has succinctly said that Pollux had a much more descriptive aim, which makes his work more difficult to actually compare to that of Phrynichus.

10 See Roumanis and Bentein (2023: pp. 23–28).

2 Impersonal modality to negotiate linguistic norms in Atticist lexicographers

2.1 Impersonal modal verbs in the Atticist lexicographers

Before we embark on our analysis, we would like to discuss the distribution of different impersonal modal strategies in the Atticist lexicographers as a whole.

Lemma	Aelius Dionysius	Pausanias	Phrynichus		<i>Antiatticist</i>	Moeris
			<i>Ecloga</i>	<i>PS</i>		
<i>Positive (Non-negated)</i>						
δεῖ	1	1	10	4		1
ἔδει			1	1		
δεῖν			3			
δέον			18	4		
χρή			37	6		
ἐχρῆν			5			
δεῖν					11	
<i>Negative (Negated)</i>						
οὐ δεῖ			1			
οὐ/μὴ χρή	1		15	1		
οὐκ ἐχρῆν			1			
οὐ δεῖν					25	

Table 1 Impersonal modal strategies in the Atticist lexicographers

One thing that becomes readily apparent from this table is that these impersonal modal strategies are used especially by Phrynichus, whereas these strategies are nearly absent in Moeris and Aelius Dionysius. This may relate to the more overt evaluative stance taking for which Phrynichus is known (Roumanis & Bentein 2023). More tentatively, though, since we are dealing with incompletely transmitted lexica, it may also partially be motivated by the fact that Phrynichus came later in the Atticistic lexicographical tradition and hence had more competing norms to engage with, although Moeris of course does not seem to have made the same responsive approach. At the same time, the high degree of differentiation in the type of impersonal modal strategy used suggests that the Atticist lexicographers are not recording prestige in a uniform way, e.g. with the same purpose. In fact, we argue in the next three sections that the Atticist lexicographers use these modal strategies for three main purposes with respect to overt prestige:

1. Report norms with overt prestige (section 2.2)
2. Construct norms with overt prestige (section 2.3)
3. Negotiate norms with overt prestige (section 2.4)

2.2 Reporting norms with overt prestige

The first way in which the Atticist lexicographers provide linguistic reflections of the overt prestige of usages discussed in their work is that they *report* usage norms with overt prestige. Such reports of overt prestige patterns may be relatively concise, as in example 3, where the usage with overt prestige is very briefly marked by appending a neuter participle of an impersonal modal verb. There are many examples of this structure to report on usages with overt prestige.¹¹ Note also that the overt prestige reported for the use of ἐπίτεξ is enhanced through contrastive opposition to the wrong usage (ἀδοκίμως) by Antiphanes, who used ἐπίτοκος. In other words, the social significance of this overt-prestige usage is made ‘meaningful’ only by virtue of this contrast with the wrong usage.

(3) ἐπίτοκος ἡ γυνή· ἀδοκίμως εἶπεν Ἀντιφάνης ὁ κωμικός, δέον ἐπίτεξ. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 308)

‘The woman is *epítokos* [about to give birth]; the comic poet Antiphanes said this in an unapproved manner, it being necessary (to say) *epítex*.’

This contrast may be explicit in the linguistic structure of the sentence as well, as shown by the negation in example 4, but need not be.

(4) εὕρημα χρὴ λέγειν διὰ τοῦ η, οὐχ εὔρεμα. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 420)

‘It is necessary to say *heúrēma* [discovery] with an *ēta*, not *heúrema*.’

Such contrastive enhancement of reported norms is also found with other modal strategies, as illustrated by example 5. In this lemma, the wrong usage by the social group of the physicians (λέγουσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ πάνυ ἀμαθῶς) serves as the point of contrast to the usage with overt prestige: διεῖναι.

(5) Ἀνεῖναι ἐλαίῳ ἢ ὄξει ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ λέγουσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ πάνυ ἀμαθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ διεῖναι λέγειν. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 18)

‘The physicians very ignorantly say *aneînai* [to dilute] oil, vinegar, or anything else; for one must say *dieînai*.’

To report usages with overt prestige we found that social groups are used more often, specifically to embed what ought to be done in direct contrast to the usage of contemporary social groups which lack authority (see also Matthaios 2013, 2015b for the crucial role of social groups in the prescriptivism of Polux’ *Onomasticon*): διεφθορὸς αἶμα· τῶν

¹¹ See also Phryn. *Ecl.* 33, 80, 137, 139, 217, 308, 309, 311, 316 for the same types of example.

ἀμαθῶν τινες ἰατρῶν λέγουσιν οὕτω σολοικίζοντες, *δέον* λέγειν διεφθαρμένον αἷμα· τὸ γὰρ διεφθορε διέφθειρεν (Phryn. *Ecl.* 131) ‘*diephthoròs haîma* [corrupted blood]; some of the ignorant physicians say it like this, incorrectly, it being necessary to say *diephtharménon haîma*; for (the word is) *diéphthore, diéphtheiren*’; ἀφήλιξ λέγοντες ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ῥητορικοί, τούναντίον γὰρ ἢ δεῖ χρῶνται· τὸν μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον ῥητέον ἀφήλικα· οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ μηδέπω τῆς ἐννόμου ἡλικίας χρῶνται. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 47) ‘Rhetoricians err in saying *aphêlix* [elder], for they use it in the opposite way from how they should; for an older man should be called an *aphêlix*, but they use (the word) for a child not yet of legal age’. Of course, more ‘abstract’ or idealized social groups which are unlikely to refer to contemporary usage also feature in these prestige reports, such as the οἱ δόκιμοι or οἱ ἀρχαῖοι (see resp. Phryn. *Ecl.* 341 and 14).

Moreover, as in other examples, we find the use of the particle γάρ with the impersonal modal, which explicitly signals that the impersonal modal marks background information to the lexicographer’s negative evaluation of the wrong usage: X is used wrongly by Y, for one ought to say Z.¹² Similarly, we find examples confirming that the overt prestige norms which Atticist lexicographers are reporting may be based on specific pieces of accepted linguistic knowledge; this is shown in example 6 where the reportative phrase εἴρηται δὲ κατὰ συγκοπήν ‘it is said to [be] syncope’ demonstrates the interplay of accepted linguistic knowledge with overt prestige norms.

(6) ἄμβωνες (Aristoph.): πάντα τὰ ὑπερέχοντα καὶ ἀνεστηκότα. εἴρηται δὲ κατὰ συγκοπήν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀνάβων, ἐφ’ ᾧ ἀναβῆναι χρή, ὡς ἀνάπτως καὶ ἄμπωτις. (Phryn. *PS* 18.3–5)
 ‘*ambōnes* [protuberances]: all things that are stood up and prominent. But it is said (to be) syncope. For (the noun) is *anábon*, wherefore one should (say) *anábenai* [to go up], just as *anáptōtis* and *ámpōtis* [tides].’

Finally, we should zoom out and consider the question of whether this type of strategy of dealing with overt prestige is particular to a specific Atticist lexicographer or not. Crucially, all instances (except one, Ael. Dion. ε 13) in which we find the use of impersonal modal strategies in the Atticist lexicographers Aelius Dionysius, Pausanias and Moeris, they are using these impersonal modal strategies to *report* usage norms with overt prestige, as illustrated in examples 7 to 9. All other examples of reporting norms of overt prestige are found in Phrynichus’ works. We would like to, very tentatively though (also based on the status of the textual evidence from Erbse’s edition), suggest that this distributional difference might perhaps be interpreted as a reflection of a movement of *reporting* norms with overt prestige in the earlier period of Atticist lexicography versus a later reactive period of Atticist lexicography, since the more overtly subjective constructing (type 2, section 2.3) and intersubjective negotiation (type 3, section 2.4) of norms with overt prestige is a phenomenon belonging predominantly to later periods of Atticist lexicography (as very tentatively suggested by table 1 above).

12 See Phryn. *Ecl.* 7, 14, 19, 25, 47, 78 (= example 2 above), 86, 88 (= example 1 above), 95, 128, and Phryn. *PS* 93.13–94.8 for the same strategy.

(7) κροτῶνος ὑγιέστερος (cf. Ael. D. v 2). τοῦτο δεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζώου δέχεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντοθεν ὁμοῖον καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν διακοπήν, ἀλλ' εἶναι λιαν ὁμαλόν. διὰ τοῦτο ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν. 'ὑγιέστερος κροτῶνος'. (Paus. κ 47)

'*krotónos hugiésteros* [healthier than a tick]: one should understand this as referring to an animal. For it is the same from every side and has no interruptions, but is very even. For this reason, they say from this: '*hugiésteros krotónos*'.'

(8) (σίγμα). τὰ σίγμα δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ σίγματα, καὶ γὰρ ἄκλιτα τῶν στοιχείων τὰ ὀνόματα. διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς εἰρημένον (IV 4, 10) οὐχ ὕφ' ἐν 'τὰ σίγματα τῶν ἀσπίδων' ἀναγνωστέον, ἀλλὰ δυσλλάβως μὲν 'τὰ σίγμα' καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς 'τὰ τῶν ἀσπίδων' κατὰ διάστασιν (Ael. Dion. σ 15, ll. 1–4)

'(*sigma*) [(the letter) sigma]: one should say *tà sigma* [the sigmas], but not *tà sigmata*, for the names of the letters are indeclinable; hence also in Xenophon's *Hellenica* one should not read with one word (viz. article) "*tà sigmata tōn aspīdōn* [the *Sigmata* of the shields]", but with two syllables, "*tà sigma*", and with two words (viz. articles) from another (clause) beginning "*tà tōn aspīdōn*".'

(9) ὑπόγυιον δεῖ τάττειν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος. σημαίνει δὲ ἐκάτερον πρόσφατον. (Moer. v 8)

'One must use *hupógyuion* [imminent] with reference to the future, not the past. But it means *prósphaton* [recent] in each case.'

2.3 Constructing norms with overt prestige

A second way in which we find engagement with the overt prestige of usages is the *construction* of norms with overt prestige, that is, the subjective positioning of norms as having overt prestige within the community. This usage may be illustrated briefly by means of example 10 from Phrynichus' *Ecloga*. Rather than directly commenting on the mistake, Phrynichus adduces another mistake, viz. using an -ν in ὀρθρινός, which he uses as the basis from which to infer (see the inferential particle οὖν) that ὀψινός must be ὄψιος. In contrast to the examples discussed under reporting norms, we witness subjective positioning on the part of Phrynichus here, as he actively constructs the norm with overt prestige by combining overt prestige rules (χρή) with subjective inference (οὖν). In fact, it may come as no surprise that all examples which belong to this group occur in Phrynichus and exclusively in the *Ecloga*, since it has been concluded elsewhere that the evaluative language used in Phrynichus' *Ecloga* leans towards subjectivity and prescription (Roumanis & Bentein 2023: p. 28).

(10) ὀψινός· ὁμοίως τῷ ὀρθρινός τοῦτο ἀμάρτημα· χρή οὖν ἄνευ τοῦ ν, ὄψιος. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 35)

'*opsinós* [late]: *orthrinós* is likewise a mistake; therefore one should (use the form) without the *nu*, *opsios*'.

Similar examples are where Phrynichus *negatively* frames what ought to be done, as in example 11 below, thereby revealing that he explicitly takes up a different position from

what is considered to have overt prestige. This type of strategy occurs in many other places in Phrynichus' *Ecloga* as well (see Phryn. *Ecl.* 1, 23, 26, 149, 195, 227, 229, 250, 360, 373).

(11) συγγνωμονῆσαι οὐ χρὴ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ συγγνῶναι. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 360)
'One should not say *suggnōmonēsai* [to agree], but *suggnōnai*.'

In one famous instance, Phrynichus' subjective stance becomes very overtly rhetorical, as he effectively states that nobody but Menander would have the audacity to use such an undesirable expression. Suffice it to say, however, that this example is rather unique within the different strategies with which Phrynichus reflects on the overt prestige of usages, since, as for example shown in section 2.2, he also reports norms of overt prestige in a more objectivizing fashion. This particular comment is part of a (loose) block of entries in the *Ecloga* that comment on Menander,¹³ who, by way of response, is also the subject of seven entries in the *Antiatticist*.¹⁴ The comment occurs in Book Two of the *Ecloga*, and is itself a reply to the *Antiatticist*'s straightforward acceptance of καταφαγᾶς as a legitimate Attic form, based merely on the fact that Menander has used it: καταφαγᾶς Μένανδρος Πωλουμένοις (fr. 320) '*kataphagās* [glutton]; Menander (uses it) in the *Polouménoi*'.¹⁵

(12) καταφαγᾶς· πόθεν, Μένανδρε, συσσύρας τὸν τοσοῦτον τῶν ὀνομάτων συρφετὸν αἰσχύνεις τὴν πάτριον φωνήν; τίς γὰρ δὴ τῶν πρὸ σοῦ τῶ καταφαγᾶς κέχρηται; ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστοφάνης οὕτω φησίν· “ἔστι γὰρ καταφαγᾶς τις ἄλλος ἢ Κλεώνυμος;” ἐχρῆν οὖν Κρατίνῳ πειθόμενον φαγᾶς εἰπεῖν. ἴσως δ' ἂν εἴποις ὅτι ἠκολούθησας Μυρτίλῳ λέγοντι “ὥς ὁ μὲν κλέπτῃς, ὁ δ' ἄρπαξ, ὁ δ' ἀνάπηρος πορνοβοσκὸς καταφαγᾶς· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐχρῆν τὰς ἅπαξ εἰρημένας λέξεις ἀρπάζειν. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 402)
'*kataphagās* [glutton]; from where, Menander, did you sweep together such a refuse of words and bring shame to your ancestral language? For who among your predecessors has used (the word) *kataphagās*? Aristophanes says the following: “There's another *katōphagās* [glutton] besides Cleonymus?” (Ar. *Av.* 289). You therefore should have trusted Cratinus in saying *phagās* [glutton]. But perhaps one could say that you followed Myrtilus, who said “One is a thief, another a robber, another a disabled *kataphagās* who keeps a brothel”; but you should not have reached for words that have only been used once before.'

Phrynichus can also be relatively transparent about the way in which he constructs the norm¹⁶, as illustrated by example 13 below, where he tells us that he first made a full

13 They are the following: Phryn. *Ecl.* 390–4, 396, 397, 402, 408, 410; five other entries in the *Ecloga* comment on Menander (Phryn. *Ecl.* 157, 170, 304, 341, 367).

14 They are the following: *Antiatt.* α 99, β 1, δ 35, ε 92, ε 117, κ 104 (= Phryn. *Ecl.* 402), ν 3. See also Tribulato (2013: pp. 205–211), but note that she follows Bekker's entry-numbering system, since Valente's edition of the *Antiatticist* had not yet been published.

15 See Valente (2015: p. 52 nn. 310, 53 313).

16 Another example where he is quite transparent is Phryn. *Ecl.* 249 γεννήματα· πολλαχοῦ ἀκούω τὴν λέξιν τιθεμένην ἐπὶ τῶν καρπῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οἶδα ἀρχαίαν καὶ δόκιμον οὔσαν. χρὴ οὖν ἀντὶ τοῦ γεννήματα καρποῦς λέγειν ξηροῦς καὶ ὑγροῦς. '*gennēmata* [fruits]: **I hear** the word used in many places for 'fruits', but **I do not know** that (this use) is ancient and approved. Therefore, instead of *gennēmata*, one should say *karpoi ksēroi* [dried fruits] and *karpoi hugroi* [fresh fruits].'

inquiry before concluding from that investigation that the best available alternative (to a non-attested word in Attic) is an alternative attested in the comic poets.

(13) βρώμος· πάνυ ἐζήτησα, εἰ χρὴ λέγειν ἐπὶ τῆς δυσωδίας· μέχρι οὖν εὐρίσκεται, ἄχαριν ὀσμὴν λέγε ὥσπερ οἱ κωμωδοποιοί. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 126)

‘*brōmos* [a stink]: I looked everywhere, as to whether one should say (it to mean) a *dusōdía* [bad smell]; therefore, until it is found, you say *ákharis osmé* [unpleasant smell], just as the comic poets do.’

Other times, his subjective inference is carefully wrapped within a host of intersubjective strategies which mark what the addressee (i.e. the reader) would reasonably know. In example 14 below, we can observe that Phrynichus first relies heavily on what the reader would know (see οἶσθα ‘you know’ and the impersonal predicate νομίζεται ‘is considered’) before strongly concluding (see οὖν καὶ) that this usage should be erased. In other words, the use of these intersubjective strategies is a way for Phrynichus to embed his own subjective inference.¹⁷

(14) ἐσχάτως ἔχει· ἐπὶ τοῦ μοχθηρῶς ἔχει καὶ σφαλερῶς τάττουσιν οἱ σύρφακες, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτως χρήσις, οἶσθα, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄκρου παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις νομίζεται, “ἐσχάτως πονηρός”, “ἐσχάτως φιλόσοφος”. διαγραπτέον οὖν καὶ τοῦτο. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 369)

‘*eskhátōs ekhei* [it is at the extremity]: the rabble mistakenly uses it for *mokhtērōs ekhei* [it is in a bad way]. But you know that this use of *eskhátōs*, is considered by the ancients (to be) for *ákros* [extremity], “*eskhátōs ponērós* [extremely wicked]”, “*eskhátōs philósophos* [extremely philosophical]”. Therefore this should also be erased.’

A similar example is the next one, where we first find a list of background information on the wrong and the right usage of ποδαπός (introduced twice by γάρ), from which Phrynichus concludes how exactly it should be used (viz. only with reference to what kind of manner of a person), for which he even provides an example. The comment itself seems to have its origins in an ongoing sound change which led to misspellings, since we find such misspellings in the papyri as well as in literary texts¹⁸ and the devoicing of dentals is a known sound change in Post-Classical Greek.¹⁹

17 A similar effect is created by the use of ‘we’ in the following lemma, since it puts Phrynichus, the reader and the ancients in an idealized speech community: ἀπηρτισμένον, ἀπήρτικα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων ἅπαντα σόλοικα. ἀποτετέλεσται δὲ καὶ ἀποτετελεσμένον χρῆ λέγειν, ἄμεινον γάρ· ἐκτός εἰ μὴ ποθεν τοῦτο εἰς Φαβωρίνον ἦλθεν, ὅθεν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν· ἀρχαίοι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οὐ λέγουσιν, ἐκείνος δὲ· πλὴν εἰ μὴ εἰς εἰς. ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς οἱ ἀρχαίοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς Φαβωρίνος. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 422) ‘*apértisménon, apértika* [complete(ly)]: all (forms) derived from these are also wrong. **One should** say *apotetélestai* and *apotetelesménon*, for (they are) better; unless they come from somewhere in Favorinus, no one knows where (they are) from. For the ancients do not say it like this, but he does; except if he was not one. We, therefore, (will speak) **as the ancients** (do), but not as Favorinus.’

18 E.g. P.Lund. line 10 on the verso and NT *Ev.Mat.* 8.27.

19 See Horrocks (2010: p. 112).

(15) ποταπὸς διὰ τοῦ τ μὴ εἴπῃς, ἀδόκιμον γάρ· διὰ δὲ τοῦ δ λέγων ἐπὶ γένους θήσεις. “ποδαπὸς ἐστὶ;” “Θηβαῖος ἢ Ἀθηναῖος”. ἔστι γὰρ οἶον “ἐκ τίνος δαπέδου;”. Τὸ ποταπὸς δε, εἴ τις εἴποι “ποταπὸς τὸν τρόπον Φρύνιχος;” “ἐπιεικῆς”. χρὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐρωτᾶν· “ποιὸς σοὶ τις δοκεῖ εἶναι;” (Phryn. *Ecl.* 36)
 ‘Do not say *potapós* [from where] with the *tau*, for it is not approved; but you will use it with the *delta* for *génos* [place]. “*podapós esti* [where is he from?] From Thebes or Athens?”. For it is like (asking) “*ek tinos dapédou* [from which soil?]”. Rather, *potapós* (is), if one says “*potapós tòn trópon Phrúnikhos* [what kind (of person) is Phrynichus?] A good person”. Therefore one should ask like this: “*poiós soi tis dokei einai* [what kind (of person) does he seem to be?]’.

2.4 Negotiating norms with overt prestige

Lastly, there is a group of lemmata which openly *negotiate* the overt prestige between different sources of authority after which one overt prestige norm is selected. In other words, there are competing overt norms in such lemmata from which the lexicographer selects one. This type occurs 13 times in Phrynichus, once in Aelius Dionysius (example 17 below) and 38 times in the *Antiatticist*. The comment by Phrynichus in example 16 demonstrates his linguistic awareness of competing forms of overt prestige, since he explicitly notes that *his* prescribed form is better than another form of overt prestige (viz. based on an unidentified witness). Like the comment by Phrynichus, the one by Aelius identifies the same principle of negotiating between different ‘authorities’ and choosing one, viz. to use the iota as a linking vowel in compounds despite later authorities using an alpha as linking vowel.

(16) ἔσχατον χρὴ λέγειν, οὐχὶ ἔσχατώτατον, εἰ καὶ μάρτυρα παρέχοι τις. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 105)
 ‘One should say *éskhatos* [extreme], not *eskhatótatos* [most extreme], even if one could provide a witness.’

The one example in Aelius Dionysius is very similar, since he puts two authorities next to each other, viz. one ought not (...), even though it seemed that those later say it like that (οὐ χρὴ, εἰ καὶ ἔδοξε τοῖς ὕστερον οὕτω λέγειν).

(17) (εἰκοσίπηχυ καὶ εἰκοσίκλινον καὶ) εἰκοσιστάδιον· (Ἀττικῶς) διὰ τοῦ ι· εἰκοσάπηχυ δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ εἰκοσάκλινον καὶ εἰκοσαστάδιον οὐ χρὴ, εἰ καὶ ἔδοξε τοῖς ὕστερον οὕτω λέγειν, οἳ καὶ πεντάκλινον καὶ τοιαῦτά τινα λέγουσιν. (Aelius Dionysius ε 13)
 ‘(eikosípekhū [twenty-cubit] and eikosíklinon [twenty-seat-table]) eikosistádion [twenty-stade]: (in Attic) with the *iota*; but one should not say *eikosápēkhu*, *eikosáklinon* and *eikosistádion*, even if it seemed good to later (writers), who say *pentáklinon* [five-seat-table] and suchlike, to say it like this.’

Since such examples are not found elsewhere in what is available to us from other early Atticistic lexicographers (but we currently of course do not have everything), we would be tempted to conclude from this that the explicit negotiation of norms with overt prestige arose later in Atticistic lexicography in particular. At the same time, however,

their engagement with norms of overt prestige is also tightly connected with the overall rhetorical goals of their works, which influences how they engage with norms of overt prestige. For example, the *Antitatticist* develops a very clear strategy of deconstructing Phrynichus' strict understanding of Attic Greek via the maintenance of a wider canon which motivates his exclusive use of negotiation of norms with overt prestige.

In fact, the examples of this type fall into two distinct groups, since Phrynichus relatively openly negotiates the overt prestige of a usage by means of contrasting forms of authority, whereas the *Antiatticist* typically *renegotiates* the overt prestige of usage. To illustrate, in example 18 and 19, we can directly observe Phrynichus' conscious negotiation between authorities and his own prescriptions: in 18, despite the use of this syntactically innovative form in Lysias, who is a model of high authority to the Atticists, Phrynichus states that this use should be avoided: since the construction is foreign, i.e. not Attic (ξένη ἢ σύνταξις), it should be avoided; in 19, even attestations with the ancients should not always be taken as the definitive test for overt prestige, since Phrynichus says to avoid that usage, despite the fact that others deemed it the norm with overt prestige (see λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ᾗθησαν καὶ τοῦτο δεῖν λέγειν.). Another motivating factor may be diachrony, as there are comments by Moeris that say to avoid the prepositional replacements of case forms (la Roi 2022: pp. 223–224) and the example below could be related to the replacement of dative functions by prepositions.

(18) “τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἀκολουθοῦντα μετ’ αὐτοῦ”. Λυσίας ἐν τῷ Κατ’ Αὐτοκράτους οὕτω τῇ συντάξει χρῆται, ἐχρῆν δὲ οὕτως εἰπεῖν· “τὸν ἀκολουθοῦντα αὐτῷ”. τί ἂν οὖν φαίη τις, ἀμαρτεῖν τὸν Λυσίαν, ἢ νοθεύειν καινοῦ σχήματος χρῆσιν; ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ ξένη ἢ σύνταξις, πάντη παραιτητέα, ῥητέον δὲ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 330)

“*tòn paída tòn akolouthoúnta met’ autoú* [the child following with him]”: Lysias uses this construction in his *Against Autocrates (for Seduction)* (fr. 20), but he should have said the following: “*tòn akolouthoúnta autói* [the one following him]”. What, therefore, should one say? that Lysias erred? or that his use of this novel construction is spurious? But since the syntax is foreign, it must be rejected altogether, and one should say *akoloutheîn autói*.’

(19) τελευταίωτον λέγειν ἀμάρτημα τῶν περὶ παιδείαν δοκούντων τευτάζειν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον εὔρον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ᾗθησαν καὶ τοῦτο δεῖν λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὺ τελευταῖον λέγε. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 46)

‘It is a mistake, of those who think that they are learned, to say *teleutaiótatos* [very last]; for since it is a most ancient form, said by the ancients, they thought that they should also say (it). But say *teleutaiós*.’

An example such as 19 stands in direct contrast to an example such as 20, where two forms of usage are attested with the ancients, viz. γλωσσόκομος and γλωττοκομείον, but it is generally used (see reportative λέγεται) wrongly and therefore Phrynichus notes that only the latter ought to be used (note the use of the intersubjective particle ἀμέλει ‘of course’ to signify that the addressee ought to know this).²⁰

20 For the intersubjectification of the imperative ἀμέλει ‘do not worry’ to an intersubjective particle meaning ‘of course’, see la Roi (2022b).

(20) γλωσσόκομον· τὸν μὲν τύπον καὶ τὴν θέσιν ὑπ’ ἀρχαίων ἔχει, διεφθαρμένως δὲ λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν· ἔχρην γὰρ γλωττοκομεῖον λέγειν, ὡσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 70)²¹
 ‘*glōssókōmos* [case for the reeds of musical instruments]: it has its form and position (viz. length) from the ancients, but it is spoken corruptly by many; for they should have said *glōttokomeion* [case for the reeds of musical instruments], just as, of course, the ancients did.’

Lastly, sometimes Phrynichus explicitly provides the reason why he thinks there is a need to negotiate between different forms with overt prestige; this can be illustrated by considering example 21, where Favorinus, in contrast to what one may expect (see μέντοι), made a mistake with this construction, which has led to people thinking that it was necessary to use it wrongly that way (cf. ὅτι οὐ χρῆ αἱ ναῦς λέγειν, ἀλλὰ αἱ νῆες, ᾧήθη δεῖν λέγειν καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ὁμοίως, τὰς νῆας).

(21) αἱ νῆες ἔρεῖς, οὐχ αἱ ναῦς· σόλοικον γάρ· ἤμαρτε μέντοι Φαβωρίνος, Πολέμων καὶ Σύλλας αἱ ναῦς εἰπόντες· τὰς νῆας οὐκ ἔρεῖς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ναῦς. Λολλιανὸς δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς ἀκούσας παρὰ τινος, ὅτι οὐ χρῆ αἱ ναῦς λέγειν, ἀλλὰ αἱ νῆες, ᾧήθη δεῖν λέγειν καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ὁμοίως, τὰς νῆας· οὐκ ἔχει δὲ οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς εὐθείας δισυλλάβως, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς μονοσυλλάβως. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 140)
 ‘You will say *hai nêes* [the ships (nom.)], not *hai nauis* [the ships (nom.)], for it is a mistake. Favorinus, however, along with Polemon and Sulla, erred when he said *hai nauis*. You will not say *tàs nêas*, but *tàs nauis* [the ships (acc.)]. And Lollianus the sophist, after he heard from someone, that one should not say *hai nauis*, but *hai nêes*, thought that he should say the accusative likewise, *tàs nêas*. But it is not like this; rather, (it is) disyllabic in the nominative, and monosyllabic in the accusative.’

In the *Antiatticist*, we find the majority of the examples serving to (re)negotiate between forms with overt prestige. At first glance, this should not come as a surprise given what we know about the origins of the *Antiatticist* as a responsive work which had as one of its main aims to broaden the horizon of forms which were perceived to be accepted in contemporary Atticism. Valente (2015: pp. 43–51) has in fact already noted that the *Antiatticist* has many different linguistic ways to state that something is found contrary to what has been suggested before (e.g. negation, ‘instead’ etc.). Also, while it is not certain that Phrynichus had access to the *Antiatticist* while composing Book One (Valente 2015: pp. 52–54), the relationship between the former and Book Two is clear enough. There are many instances, including Antiatt. ρ 2 and Phryn. *Ecl.* 383 (see below), where comments in the *Ecloga* seem to be responding to similar ones made in the *Antiatticist*. With regard

21 In a similar entry in the *PS* (58.8–11), the order of the words commented on is reversed (γλωττοκομεῖον is the headword), and, although the tone is slightly less prescriptive (conceding the development of a later, different sense of the word), Phrynichus nevertheless states that only the ἀμαθεῖς use the word γλωσσόκομος incorrectly (γλωττοκομεῖον: ἐπὶ μόνου τοῦ τῶν αὐλητικῶν γλωττῶν ἀγγείου. ὕστερον δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑτέραν χρῆσιν κατεσκευάζετο, βιβλίων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἀργύρου ἢ ὄτουσῶν ἄλλου. καλοῦσι δ’ αὐτὸ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς γλωσσόκομον. ‘*glōttokomeion*: only (used) to refer to a case for keeping mouthpieces. And, later, it was also elaborated for another use: for books, cloaks, money, or whatever else. But the ignorant call this a *glōssókōmos*.’); cf. also the more descriptive comment in Pollux (10.153), who cites Classical writers, including the Old Comic poet Lysippus, to illustrate the meaning of γλωττοκομεῖον as a case for mouthpieces.

to the strategies under discussion here, there is indeed a remarkable uniformity in the way that the *Antiatticist* negotiates or, rather, renegotiates forms of prestige. Comparing relatively typical examples such as 23 and 24, the *Antiatticist* explicitly puts forward the competing form of overt prestige: οὐ φασι δεῖν λέγειν “they say that one ought not say”. Yet, the alternative which the *Antiatticist* places before this competing prestige form is what it posits as having prestige too, τροχάζειν in the case of 23 and ῥύμην in the case of example 24.

(23) τροχάζειν· οὐ φασι δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τρέχειν. (Antiatt. τ 4)

‘*trokházein* [to run]: they say that one should not say (it), but rather *trékhein*.’

(24) ῥύμην· οὐ φασι δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ στενωπόν. (Antiatt. ρ 2)

‘*rhúmē* [narrow passage]: they say that one should not say (it), but rather *stenōpós*.’

In fact, for example 24 we possess parallel evidence from the *Ecloga* where Phrynichus reports (i.e. strategy type 1) that the use of ῥύμη(ν) was perceived as not having overt prestige, confirming that this lemma in the *Antiatticist* explicitly sought to widen the remit of forms with overt prestige within Atticistic discourse (see ῥύμη· καὶ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐτίθησαν, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀμαθεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ στενωποῦ. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τοῦτο Μακεδονικὸν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ στενωπὸν καλεῖν χρεῖ, ῥύμην δὲ τὴν ὀρμῆν. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 383) ‘*rhúmē* [narrow passage]: the Athenians used this to refer to an *hormē* [rush], but the ignorant today (use it) to mean a *stenōpós* [narrow passage]. But this seems to me to be a Macedonian usage. One should, then, call (a narrow passage) a *stenōpós*, and a rush a *rhúmē*.’)²²

Furthermore, the lemmas in the *Antiatticist* that use impersonal modal verbs provide evidence in two other areas as well; on the one hand, the variation in the *Antiatticist* in how the overt prestige form is presented suggests that the *Antiatticist* explicitly doubts the objective character of prescriptions from other Atticists: ἀξιοῦσι δεῖν λέγειν (Antiatt. γ 4), ὡς οἴονται δεῖν λέγειν (Antiatt. γ 18), οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν λέγειν (Antiatt. κ 40) in contrast to the standard use of φασι δεῖν λέγειν (with and without negation); on the other hand, the *Antiatticist*’s explicit corrections of norms with overt prestige by referring to accepted Atticistic models lays bare the ideological nature of the prescriptions found in other Atticistic lexicography: see example 25 below where the *Antiatticist* explicitly notes that Antiphanes *does* use the rejected construction. Similar examples can be found in which reference is made to other highly valued Atticistic models, such as Euripides and Herodotus (Antiatt. γ 4), Demosthenes (Antiatt. ε 27) or Plato (Antiatt. ο 4, Antiatt. κ 40, Antiatt. φ 8).

22 As Tribulato (2022: p. 923) has shown, the New Comic poet Philippides probably lies behind the Macedonian reference in both the *Ecloga* and the *Antiatticist*—Pollux, in his *Onomasticon* (9.38), tells us that Philippides, a friend of Lysimachus, used ῥύμη with the meaning of ‘narrow passage’ in two separate plays (*PCG* ffr. 22 and 14). She also notes, astutely, that, on account of his responding to Book One of the *Ecloga*, the *Antiatticist* was likely also referring to a Classical writer (quite possibly Philippides)—a reference now lost—and so is merely reporting that ‘strict Atticists’ used στενωπός but not ῥύμη, rather than prescribing the usage.

(25) ἤθη· πληθυντικῶς φασὶ μὴ δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐνικῶς· ἀλλ' Ἀντιφάνης εἶπε πληθυντικῶς (*Antiatt.* η 4)

'*éthē* [customs]: they say that one should not say (it) in the plural, but in the singular; Antiphanes, however, did say (it) in the plural.'

In sum, both in Phrynichus' works and, especially, in the *Antiatticist* we find the strategic use of impersonal modal strategies to (re)negotiate norms of overt prestige, demonstrating that the Atticistic lexicography was by no means a uniform repository of knowledge in which uses did and did not have overt prestige.

Conclusions

We hope to have demonstrated that the impersonal modal strategies used in the Atticistic lexicographers provide unique insights into the different ways in which these Atticist lexicographers mediate the forms of overt prestige that certain usages had. Based on an investigation of the corpus, we have concluded that the Atticist lexicographers use impersonal modal strategies in three distinct ways. First of all, they report usages with overt prestige within their community, typically by relying on accepted forms of background knowledge (e.g. introduced with γάρ or reportative structures) and/or contrasting the accepted usage with the wrong usage by specific social groups that lack authority. Secondly, only Phrynichus uses impersonal deontic modals to subjectively construct overt prestige norms, based either on a deduction (cf. the use of inferential οὖν) from established 'rules' or from what is marked intersubjectively as a practice with overt prestige (e.g. 'you know', 'of course'). Third and finally, some Atticistic lexicographers use impersonal deontic modals to (re)negotiate the overt prestige accorded to different usages in the face of competition between strategies for overt prestige and the basis for its authority (e.g. Atticistic models, lexicographers).

Furthermore, the contrastive examination of the Atticistic lexicographers has yielded important insights into the differences between the Atticistic lexicographers; in particular, whereas, keeping in mind the many necessary caveats in terms of textual transmission, early Atticistic lexicographers such as Aelius Dionysius and Pausanias seem to almost exclusively report norms of language usage with overt prestige, later Atticistic lexicographers such as Phrynichus also subjectively construct and negotiate overt prestige norms, with the *Antiatticist* exclusively using impersonal modal strategies to renegotiate overt prestige norms.²³ At the same time, based on the available evidence, the results suggested that the works by Phrynichus seem to be somewhat of an outlier within Atticist lexicography, because he seems to be the only one subjectively constructing overt norms but uses impersonal deontic modality to report and negotiate norms of prestige as well. It is hoped that future research will further refine our understanding of the differences and similarities

23 Another relevant factor is the different ways in which accepted literary models feature in the various Atticist lexica, an issue that we could not discuss here.

between the Atticist lexica in order to challenge our own received views of prescriptivism and Atticism.

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
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