Title: Problém statečnosti v Aristotelově nauce o středu
Variant title:
- The problem of courage in Aristotle's doctrine of the mean
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2019, vol. 20, iss. 1, pp. 16-26
Extent
16-26
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Persistent identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf19-1-1857
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/141783
Type: Article
Language
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
Nauka o středu představuje jeden ze stěžejních pilířů Aristotelovy etiky a je úzce provázána s jeho pojetím etických zdatností. Ty jsou podle Aristotela flexibilní s ohledem na kontext praktické situace. Pojetí statečnosti se však od ostatních etických zdatností liší. Předně je zde problém dvou emocí, které Aristotelés přisuzuje zdatnosti statečnosti. Dále omezuje její oblast výhradně na válečnictví. Toto paradigma válečnictví má pak za následek, že statečnost postrádá flexibilitu etických zdatností a stává se rigidní. Tyto klíčové prvky ohrožují plausibilitu a koherenci Aristotelovy nauky o středu. Chyba ovšem není v nauce o středu jako takové, ale chyby se dopouští sám Aristotelés nesprávnou aplikací nauky o středu na statečnost.
The doctrine of the mean represents one of the main pillars of Aristotle's ethics and is closely linked with his notion of ethical virtues. These are flexible with regard to the context of the practical situation. However, the notion of courage differs from other ethical virtues. First, there is a problem of two emotions that Aristotle attributes to the virtue of courage. Next, he restricts the area of courage solely to warfare. This paradigm of warfare results in courage lacking ethical virtues' flexibility and becoming rigid. These key elements threaten the plausibility and coherence of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The mistake, however, is not in the doctrine of the mean itself, but in Aristotle's incorrect application of the doctrine of the mean to courage.
Note
Studie vznikla v rámci výzkumného projektu řešeného na Ostravské univerzitě č. IRP201820 Utváření jinakosti ve středověké Evropě.
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[11] Hursthouse, R. (1980): A False Doctrine of the Mean, Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society 81(1), 57–72. | DOI 10.1093/aristotelian/81.1.57
[12] Jiang, X. (1994): Courage, Passion and Virtue, Bell & Howell co.
[13] Leighton, S. R. (1988): Aristotle's Courageous Passions, Phronesis 33, 76–99. | DOI 10.1163/156852888X00045
[14] Miller, W. I. (2002): The Mystery of Courage, Harvard University Press.
[15] Nussbaumová, M. (2003): Křehkost dobra. Přel. D. Korte, Oikoymenh.
[16] Pakaluk, M. (2005): Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press.
[17] Pangle Smith, L. (2018): The Anatomy of Courage in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, The Review of Politics 80, 569–590. | DOI 10.1017/S0034670518000475
[18] Pears, D. (1980): Courage as a Mean, in Rorty, A. O. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, University of California Press, 171–187.
[19] Pearson, G. (2014): Courage and Temperance, in Polansky, R. (ed.) A Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 110–134.
[20] Platón (1995): Lachés. Přel. F. Novotný, Oikoymenh.
[21] Raymond, C. C. (2017): Shame and Virtue in Aristotle, in Caston, V. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53, Oxford University Press, 111–161.
[22] Richardson Lear, G. (2004): Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Princeton University Press.
[23] Ross, D. (1974): Aristotle, Methuen.
[24] Synek, S. (2011): Lidská přirozenost jako úkol člověka, Togga.
[25] Urmson, J. O. (1996): Aristotelova nauka o středu, in Rezek, P. (ed.) Spravedlnost jako zdatnost, Oikoymenh, 9–23.
[26] Young, C. M. (2009): Courage, in Anagnostopoulos, G. (ed.) A Companion to Aristotle, Blackwell Publishing, 442–456.
[27] Zavaliy, A. G. (2017): How Homeric is the Aristotelian Conception of Courage, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55(3), 350–377. | DOI 10.1111/sjp.12240