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**ALWAYS TO BE PASSED ALONG:
APORIAS OF WAGNER, HEIDEGGER, AND #METOO**

Jan Čapek

Abstract

Aporetic – the undecidable, undecided, that which collapses identity, that which denounces representation, clear perception, and straightforward reception. Stemming from the Greek mythos of Poros, Penia, and Eros, discussed by Plato in *The Symposium*, the concept has found new importance in post-structuralist thought as one of the constituents of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction. Yet its application does not remain in the past. This paper presents a concise introduction to aporia from the original mythos to its application in post-structuralist thought. This paper then applies the concept in the investigation of the issue of the division between artists and their work, from “celebrities” of various strata throughout Western culture such as Richard Wagner or Martin Heidegger, to the culprits of the recent campaign #MeToo. The article discusses aporia, and our awareness of it, as something which does not bow down before decisive ideological and moral constructions and, instead, engenders the endlessly productive processes of debating, discussing, or simply thinking.

Keywords

Aporia; impasse; Jacques Derrida; deconstruction; #MeToo; cultural studies; ideology; post-structuralism

* * *

IT is those who are in between, and Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is love of the beautiful, so Love must be a philosopher, and a philosopher is in a middle state between a wise man and an ignorant one. The reason for this too lies in his parentage: he has a father who is wise and resourceful, and a mother who is neither. (Plato 2008, 40–41)

So writes Plato in *The Symposium*, an ancient philosophical text introducing the concept of aporia, “an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument, or theory” (Lexico n.d.), and a logical impasse. The aim of this article is to situate aporia in the contemporary socio-cultural climate leading up to and including the #MeToo movement. While the concept of aporia may be traced

back to Plato, whose *The Symposium* is invoked in relation to Sarah Kofman's discussion of the untranslatability of aporia, it was Jacques Derrida who, in the spirit of his proposal of *différance*,¹ revived the concept of aporia in contemporary philosophy. After the introduction of the conceptual lens of aporia, I launch an investigation into the famously controversial figures of Richard Wagner and Martin Heidegger. In a similar vein, the discussion then shifts to the present day as I ponder the controversy surrounding one of the most remarkable social movements of the beginning of the 21st century, #MeToo. This article arrives at an affirmation which hopes to lie outside of morality and emancipation for the sake of itself, as well as outside ideological misuse and, instead, finds itself on the path of a greater ethical project continuing one of the most distinct philosophical approaches of the 20th century, that of Jacques Derrida's Deconstruction. I propose aporia as a concept in accord with his general proposition for the dynamism of considering concepts constantly deferring set meanings and identities toward a fluidity of existence. In the grander scheme of things, the present discussion of aporia highlights the importance of thinking as a *process* to achieve knowledge not as a set of convictions but, rather, as a mode of dynamic perception of the world around the thinking subject in tune with the fluidity of the ever-changing world.

The journey of investigating aporia starts in ancient Greece and in the discussion of its nature in Sarah Kofman's commentary on the difficulties of translation and understanding aporia in her text "Beyond Aporia?" Therein, she contemplates the importance of aporia in Plato's texts – most notably in *The Symposium* – but also suggests that the concept was largely present in Greek philosophy in general. As Kofman hints, one shall remember the undecidability of Zeno's logical paradoxes. Achilles will never overtake the tortoise, whenever Achilles arrives somewhere the tortoise has been, he still has some distance to go before he can even reach the tortoise, *yet* it might seem that he can. The arrow will never reach its target, at every instant of time there is no motion occurring. If everything is motionless at every instant, and time is entirely composed of instants, then motion is impossible, *yet* it seems it is happening. Such situations are inherently aporetic, they exemplify aporia, the frustrating impasse, the unsolvable paradox. The inability to *arrive at something* presents itself as key to understanding aporia.

Kofman's explanation of the origins of aporia stems from her reading of the myth of the birth of Eros in Plato's *The Symposium*:

¹ The present discussion understands and utilizes Derrida's *différance* as a concept employing a combination of difference and deferral of meaning as a force working against set identity and a clear-cut centralization of discussed subjects in the systems of knowing (ontology) and of knowledge (epistemology).

When Aphrodite was born, all the gods held a feast. One of those present was Poros (Resource), whose mother was Metis (Cleverness). When the feast was over, Penia (Poverty) came begging, as happens on these occasions, and she stood by the door. Poros got drunk on the nectar – in those days wine did not exist – and having wandered into the garden of Zeus was overcome with drink and went to sleep. Then Penia, because she herself had no resource, thought of a scheme to have a child by Poros, and accordingly she lay down beside him and became pregnant with a son, Love. (Plato 2008, 39)

What Kofman suggests is a strange move out of character for both Penia and Poros, which starts to unveil the relation to Poros's opposite in the Greek pantheon, Aporia – the figure of Powerlessness:

All the characteristics which the myth attributes to Poros in fact belong in practice to Penia and vice versa. In other words, Penia is no more the opposite of Poros than is the aporia. The true, philosophical aporia, or Penia, is always fertile; in her all opposites are placed under erasure, she is neither masculine nor feminine, neither rich nor poor, neither a transition nor the absence of a transition, neither resourceful nor without resources. (Kofman 1988, 27)

If Kofman's investigation seems contrived, it is. Aporia is a contrivance and its explanation, meta-textually, may itself present an impasse and evoke perplexity and bafflement akin to the untranslatability that Kofman ascribes to it.

It was Jacques Derrida who brought the term back into the searchlight of philosophy. Derrida's whole *oeuvre* may be understood as a project towards conceptualizing aporias. Uncovering the internal struggles and discrepancies, internal controversies and tensions, would, indeed, make sense for a philosopher who was primarily concerned with the decentralization of meaning and with collapsing the illusory traditions of knowledge as found, for example, in the concept of representation. In "Sending: On Representation," Derrida uncovers representation in Martin Heidegger's thought as something that repeats (re-) an already established presupposition (-pre-) for something else (-sent/send) (1982, 307–308). Such thinking is heavily criticized by Derrida in *Of Grammatology*: "A dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity between the reflection and the reflected which lets itself be seduced narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable" (Derrida 1997, 36). The revelation lies in understanding promiscuity as productivity, and narcissistic seduction as the illusory certainty. The bases of Derrida's Deconstruction are in its decentering of the subject, the un-making of the illusion of the natural proposition of language to carry meaning and the traditional ideas of identity, presence, and representation as misleading and contrived (Derrida

1997). The most difficult conception of the world as multiplicity and chaos, may be, paradoxically, the simplest one, one that does not rely on the intertwined web of signifiers establishing themselves constantly against every other signifier, in a hyper-complex web of self-establishing information.

Considering aporia as a piece of mythology, therefore a building block of the anthropological field of Structuralism, it is no wonder that it offers itself so well for Post-structuralist agenda as a subversive element. Aporia is a constant factor revealing itself when one is confronted with the world. “Can one speak – and if so, in what sense – of an *experience of the aporia*? An *experience of the aporia as such*? Or vice versa: Is an experience possible that would not be an experience of the aporia?” (Derrida 1993, 15, italics original). If one remains in the world of mythology, all trickster figures are aporetic, their liminal position, always cited as one of their principal features, is itself aporetic. For example, Prometheus’s position between humanity and the gods, or on the border between moral and amoral, mischievous and kind, always both yet never either, is aporetic. The act of bringing fire to humanity can be judged by the gods, the transcendental figures and forces, as immoral, as theft no matter the reason. But to the human, it will always remain a welcomed gift, one that has helped humanity leap forward, come to the light of discovery and progress. Just like other trickster figures with their mischief, Prometheus’s position is one of impasse and aporia. Eros is the same, as Plato writes in *The Symposium*,

His nature is neither that of an immortal nor that of a mortal, but in the course of a single day he will live and flourish for a while when he has the resources, then after a time he will start to fade away, only to come to life again through that part of his nature which he has inherited from his father. Yet his resources always slip through his fingers, so that although he is never destitute, neither is he rich. He is always midway between the two, just as he is between wisdom and ignorance. (Plato 2008, 40)

But the impasse does not stop anything, its abundance of difference and deferral does not provoke indifference. Rather, it provokes an abundance of affect or of sensation, an explosion that tears apart ontological constraints. The constant oscillation, the pendular movement between the conflicting emotions is infinitely productive since it cannot settle and is bound to continue swaying back and forth while remaining still, travelling at an incredible, imperceptible speed while never arriving anywhere. It is found seemingly still on the trajectory from nowhere to nowhere, from everywhere to everywhere, as movement on a trajectory that is infinitely short while remaining endless. It is, perhaps, not perceivable as a movement but rather as a vibration, a constant flux. It does not guide one anywhere and does not propose a clear answer

just like one should not confront it with a clear question and expect a resolution – it is rather the processes of fluctuation and the acts of questioning that are important.

Let us imagine finding ourselves presented with a question (perhaps an invitation to a discussion) focused on the division of art and the artist, for example “Do you think that Richard Wagner should be appreciated as a genius composer although he was an anti-Semite?” In this hypothetical situation, Wagner is the first aporetic figure that this text shall investigate. He is generally regarded as one of the greatest classical composers of all time and has had an immense influence on music ever since... Yet, he also wrote an openly anti-Semitic text about “Jewishness in music” and the anti-Semitic subtext of his *oeuvre* has been contemplated by many. “What arguments are fielded by the two contrasting points of view?” asks Hanan Bruen:

Those who support the playing of Wagner’s music claim that the programming of concerts should be based on aesthetic considerations. They maintain that Wagner’s work belongs to the very best compositions created in the European cultural tradition and that a work’s artistic quality should be the only, or at least the decisive, criterion for its inclusion in a concert program. These supporters also make largely educational claims [...] Those who are opposed to the playing of Wagner’s music claim that art does not occur in a vacuum but has to be seen in its psychological and social contexts. Believing that an artist’s work and personality cannot be separated, they point out that Wagner was not only an anti-Semite but in a number of his theoretical writings espoused ideologies that are close to National-Socialist race theories and their severe implications. (1993, 100)

One of the highly regarded texts that discusses the matter in more detail is Theodore Adorno’s biography of Wagner titled *In Search for Wagner*. In the first chapter, Adorno explores Wagner’s position in a focused manner, pointing towards his anti-Semitism and its historical roots and implications:

The contradiction between mockery of the victim and self-denigration is also a definition of Wagner’s anti-Semitism. The gold grabbing, invisible, anonymous, exploitative Alberich, the shoulder-shrugging, loquacious Mime, overflowing with self-praise and spite, the impotent intellectual critic Hanslick-Beckmesser – all the rejects of Wagner’s works are caricatures of Jews. They stir up the oldest sources of the German hatred of the Jews and, at the same time, the romanticism of *The Mastersingers* seems on occasion to anticipate the abusive verses that were not heard on the streets until sixty years later. (Adorno 2005, 12–13)

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As Slavoj Žižek writes in his introduction to *In Search of Wagner*, “[...] it is not enough to ‘decode’ Alberich, Mime, Hagen and so on as Jews, making the point that the *Ring* is one big anti-tract [...] the more basic fact is that the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew itself is not a direct ultimate referent, but is already encoded, a cipher of ideological and social antagonisms” (Žižek in Adorno 2005, xiv). Adorno, perhaps in order to decode such a cipher, invokes Wagner’s own various writings in order to uncover the various strata on which the Jewishness played a significant role for him, one of which is even simple spoken language:

The first thing that strikes our ear as quite outlandish and unpleasant, in the Jew’s production of the voice-sounds, is a creaking, squeaking, buzzing snuffle: add thereto an employment of words in a sense quite foreign to our nation’s tongue, and an arbitrary twisting of the structure of our phrases – and this mode of speaking acquires at once the character of an intolerable mumbo-jumbo; so that when we hear this Jewish talk, our attention dwells involuntarily on its repulsive *how*, rather than on any meaning of its intrinsic *what*. (Wagner in Adorno 2005, 13–14)

As Adorno concludes, “Jewish speech is thereby dismissed” (2005, 14).

After Adorno recalls the well-known rumor about Wagner laughing at the death of hundreds of Jewish patrons in the Vienna *Ringtheater* fire (2005, 16), he writes about the later alignment with Nazis more decisively: “[Wagner] differs from his ideological descendants only in that he equates annihilation with salvation” (Adorno 2005, 16). A quotation from Wagner’s text on the Jewish Question that reveals a proposition for the salvation, or in the discussed section, redemption, is again presented as very troublesome: “[...] he came among us seeking for redemption; he found it not, and had to learn that *only with our redemption, too, into genuine manhood*, would he ever find it. To become man at once with us, however, means firstly for the Jew as much as ceasing to be a Jew” (Wagner in Adorno 2005, 16). “And he is not content simply with the disappearance of the hated people itself,” continues Adorno, once again replying to Wagner himself: “‘If our culture is destroyed, that is no great loss; but if it is destroyed by the *Jews*, that would be a disgrace.’ The mode of existence that longs for the destruction of the Jew is aware that it is itself beyond redemption. Hence its own downfall is interpreted as the end of the world and Jews are seen as the agents of doom” (Adorno 2005, 17).

Already in the preface Žižek discussed the public confusion about the controversy and the aesthetic/ethical discrepancy in a similar way that in Bruen’s text, aesthetic *contra* socially-aware: “Is, then, the enjoyment of Wagner to remain an obscene secret to be disavowed in public academic discourse?” (Žižek in Adorno 2005, xxvii).

As can be seen, Žižek approaches the end of his discussion of the matter with a question, followed by the proposal that “The battle for Wagner is not over: today, after the exhaustion of the critical-historicist and aestheticist paradigms, it is entering its decisive phase” (2005, xxvii). When the reader remembers that Žižek wrote the final sentence of his introduction for the 2005 edition of *In Search of Wagner*, more than five decades after its first publication in 1952, the implication that the question shall be resolved seems quite naïve, since it has not been.

The aporia is so strong that even the state of Israel has been caught in the impasse with performances and presentations of Wagner’s works being constantly argued for and against, maintaining a great air of controversy and seeming irreconcilability. “The issue is appropriate for discussion in university seminars,” comments Bruen, “yet it also addresses the average citizen. At a time of severe external and internal crises in Israel, ordinary people suddenly started to think, talk, and hold opinions about Richard Wagner. Within a time span of two weeks, dozens of articles appeared in newspapers, and hundreds of readers wrote to their editors” (1993, 102). The productivity of aporia is uncovered in its provocative nature and even Adorno’s commentary itself points to aporia in Wagner’s habitus: “Wagner’s anti-Semitism is something he shared with other representatives of what Marx called the German Socialism of 1848. But his version advertises itself as a private idiosyncrasy that stubbornly resists all negotiations. It is the basis of Wagnerian humour. Aversion and laughter come together in a clash of words” (Adorno 2005, 17).

In a similar vein, another hypothetical: “Should we appreciate Martin Heidegger as a genius philosopher worth praising or condemn him as a despicable Nazi follower?” He did write *Being and Time*, one of the principal works in Phenomenology, challenging many philosophical positions on *being* that were held before its conception. Yet he also entered the Nazi party in the early 1930s, remaining a part of it until the end of World War II, never addressing the horrors of the holocaust. As reported in Daniel and Brigit Maier-Katkin’s article “Love and Reconciliation: The Case of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger”, “in his post-factum construction of reality, Heidegger suggested that he had entered an inner emigration of spiritual resistance” (Maier-Katkin and Maier-Katkin 2007, 43), which is only one of many comments the authors have made regarding Heidegger’s evasive post-war denial of his pre-war accord with the National-Socialist Party:

For Heidegger, the Third Reich began with grandiose ambitions to lead a historic spiritual and intellectual rejuvenation of the German nation, but ended in disrepute and despair. The Nazis were pleased to have a leading philosopher among their ranks and he was appointed to the position of

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Rektor at Freiburg University, where he behaved atrociously: abolishing the faculty senate, instituting a Führer system of governance, firing Jewish faculty members, helping to align the university system with the Nazi regime, and lending intellectual respectability to a band of thugs. In public addresses he called upon students to undertake labor service and military service on behalf of the Reich, honored the exceptionalism and excellence of the German Volk and German language, thought, and tradition, often ending his speeches “*Heil Hitler*,” and on at least one occasion with this salute: “To the man of unprecedented will, to our *Führer* Adolf Hitler a threefold *Sieg Heil!*” (Maier-Katkin and Maier-Katkin 2007, 39, italics original)

Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Hitler as a statesman has been noted also in his private correspondence with his brother Fritz: “It can be seen from one day to the next how great a statesman Hitler is becoming. The world of our people and the Reich finds itself in a process of transformation, and all those who have eyes to see, ears to hear, and a heart for action will be swept along and put in a state of extreme excitement” (Heidegger in Soboczynski and Cammann 2016).

Other sources on Heidegger’s anti-Semitism (or, at least, his strong dislike of the Jewish population) have been rather recently uncovered with the publication of his *Black Notebooks*, a collection of notes and sketches. The *Black Notebooks* comment on “the worldlessness of Judaism” (2017a, 76), identify Jewishness with forceful appropriation of culture (2017a, 254), criticize Jews for “most vehement resistance to [the] unrestricted application [of the principle of race]” (2017b, 44), diminish the significance of “the psychoanalysis practiced by a Jew, ‘Freud’” (2017b, 171, italics original), or warn that “the question of the role of *world-Judaism* is not a racial question, but a metaphysical one, a question that concerns the kind of human existence which in an *utterly unrestrained* way can undertake as a world-historical “task” the uprooting of all beings from being” (2017b, 191, italics original). Fragments such as these exemplify Heidegger’s dislike of the Jews, perhaps especially due to their blasé nature. Yet there might be surprising defenders of his figure found even among the Jewish population, such as his lover Hannah Arendt: “Some of these men can also ‘be redeemed by genius or a talent so compelling that it will overrule everything else.’ Here, she offered as examples Brecht and Heidegger” (Maier-Katkin and Maier-Katkin 2007, 44). Comments like these, coming from such an intimate relationship, further complicate the judgment.

Moving along in time towards the present day in one of the most recent public discussions of the aporetic: “Is Harvey Weinstein one of the most respectable producers in Hollywood or a sexual predator?” “About a year after Kantor and Twohey first reported on the allegations against him,” writes Anna North for the server

vox.com, “Weinstein has not only lost his job at the company he co-founded – he has also been indicted on charges of rape and predatory sexual assault” (North 2018). Why mention them at this juncture? It is symptomatic of the confusion, of the irreducibility and inability to partition the two, or many, sides of the perceived identity opening to the public eye.

The role of #MeToo, a suddenly opening channel of communication through a sense of empowerment and togetherness, is instrumental. As has been recorded in the Weinstein scandal timeline on bbc.com, “Actor Tom Hanks says there can be no way back for Weinstein. ‘His last name... will become an identifying moniker for a state of being for which there was a before and an after,’ he tells the BBC” (“Harvey Weinstein Timeline” 2018). Yet it does not mean before and after the deeds Weinstein has been criticized and persecuted for, it means before and after the news broke, before the sudden rupture and the deafening flow of information uncovering Weinstein as aporetic.

The discussion of the matter has been further problematized not only by the aporia of the impasse and the crumbling of a perceived identity, it has also been problematized by the #MeToo movement itself. As discussed by Stavroula Pipyrou, “The #MeToo movement provided a platform for women to break what was in some cases decades of silence. Then, arguably, #MeToo started to spin out of control as it became clear that the boundaries of appropriate sexual behavior were a subjective matter” (2018). Pipyrou then launches an investigation into the suggested aporetic nature of the #MeToo initiative:

In this Shortcuts section, our contributors have been asked to address these opposing stances: On the one hand, #MeToo is little more than mob rule premised on vigilantism that foregoes judicial procedure in favor of public shaming. In doing so, it shifts the spotlight away from the crime and onto the individual character of perpetrator and victim, thus failing to tackle the structural problem of sexual violence. On the other hand, #MeToo provides a form of social justice that allows the sharing of taboo issues and helps break the silence surrounding serious crimes that can then be dealt with through official legal channels. (Pipyrou 2018)

In this sense one must understand that the action and consequences of #MeToo, being a public initiative shared on social media, may as well operate beyond the law. The “mob rule” aspect pondered by Pipyrou and her contributors compared against “social justice” effectively contrasts *populus* versus *socius*, the anti-social savage and uninformed popular aggression against the higher degree of reaction in a more considered social form.

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Although Pipyrrou never arrives to a convergent conclusion, her words suggest a support of the need for an aporetic approach by writing that, despite the movement's following, "All contributors acknowledge, for instance, the unhelpful role of stereotyping, of creating an essentialized other. This practice only creates bitterness, a feeling that all those who share an identity trait should be viewed as potential perpetrators, leading to a growing sense of victimization" (Pipyrrou 2018). Even the conclusion she reaches points in the direction of aporia: "It might not seem ideal that the stories are collated through a hashtag movement – with associated problems of moderation and verification – but this does provide an open-access archive and a legitimate channel for others to engage with their own harrowing experiences," writes Pipyrrou and concludes that "silence is the most striking evidence of violence, and if #MeToo potentially empowers people to tear down the walls of silence and interrogate archives of pain in the pursuit of justice, then this can only be positive" (Pipyrrou 2018).

Even when, or perhaps especially when, one reads "positive" as "productive" in an ethical sense, the double aporia of Weinstein *contra* #MeToo, aporia challenged by aporia, a guerilla war of the undecidable against the undecidable points to a fight outside the law. "And in this sense, it is impossible to have a full experience of aporia, that is, of something that does not allow passage. An aporia is a non-road. From this point of view, justice would be the experience that we are not able to experience" (Derrida 1990, 947). Is Louis C.K. to be considered a great comedian or forgotten for being a sexual predator? Is Kevin Spacey still to be considered a breathtaking actor or written off as a sexual predator? And should Robin Hood be considered a well-meaning anti-tyrant or condemned as a criminal? Is Banksy to be praised as an apt social commentator and artist or shunned for being a criminal? "Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule" (Derrida 1990, 947), and so the non-road of aporia cannot lead to the courthouse where something would be ruled, captured, or squandered with a stroke of the judicial mallet.

After all – who should decide what is *enough*, given the sheer number of people affected, involved, and having some stake in the process? Given the subjective approach to sexual behavior proposed by Pipyrrou, the greatest injustice of all might lie in the decision and the final word, finishing the project of #MeToo in some idealized final state. To avoid the trappings of set meanings, one shall not necessarily expect answers, only discussions, because aporias are always both and neither at the same time, always too much and never enough. The truth is always in-between, as one

supports the other while subverting it at the same time, constantly shifting and moving like the coils of a serpent. Coming out of the ancient transgression, aporia does not abide by any law or morals. There will never be a clear answer to the question “Which one?” without giving one of the conflicting features up, effectively bastardizing the elusive into a decidedly set, yet inherently fractured, mongrel.

One should not be misled – although aporia does not abide by law or morals, it does not mean that it cannot be instrumentatively used in order to convey moral messages or lawful warnings. If aporia is above law and morals, it is also above ideology, yet it is precisely for that reason that it can be harnessed as an *instrumentum* of ideology for any intended purpose, not as aporia but as the derivative and reductive perversity. The mongrels are welcomed in Hollywood, the bastion of what Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer called “the culture industry” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). The cult of personality and of exceptionality, hidden behind the masquerade of legacy, the institutionalized spectacle of award ceremonies, perhaps best embodied by the Academy lifetime award, is no less than one of the primary cogwheels in the immense machinery of commodification. The relationship between the actor and the audience has already been discussed by Walter Benjamin in his seminal 1936 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility”, in which he proposes that the actor knows well that, through his performance, he will in the end confront an audience, the masses who will control him. “Not only does the cult of the movie star which it fosters preserve that magic of the personality which has long been no more than the putrid magic of its own commodity character,” writes Benjamin, “but its counterpart, the cult of the audience, reinforces the corruption by which fascism is seeking to supplant the class consciousness of the masses” (Benjamin 2008, 33). The claim of the close relationship and the importance of mongrels is, perhaps, even better explained with a further quotation: “Under these circumstances, the film industry has an overriding interest in stimulating the involvement of the masses through illusionary displays and ambiguous speculations. To this end it has set in motion an immense publicity machine, in the service of which it has placed the careers and love lives of the stars; it has organized polls; it has held beauty contests” (Benjamin 2008, 34). The cult of personality revealed in the mongrel of “only exceptional artist” works as a self-propelling tool of the commodification of the images on the screens. It inspires a draw, a direct motion without the sway of the vibration of the flux, a focused vector that can, itself, be captured and investigated, commodified and exploited. “Thus,” concludes Benjamin, “the same is true of film capital in particular as of fascism in general: a compelling urge toward new social opportunities is being clandestinely exploited in the interests of a property-owning minority” (Benjamin 2008, 34). Yet the other mongrels, the repulsive, condemnable mongrel, or even the condemned and forgotten mongrel, work in the same way, as a diversion and

redirection of interest. The repressive apparatus of the audience's control may disown the personalities and expel them, but that leaves the opportunity for mere replacement, a relocation of resources and of capital and for further exploitation by the fascist apparatus of the culture industry. The aporia of the uncaptured, schizophrenic subject is the key against the exploitation. The aporetic impasse resists capture and pinning down, just like in the Aesop's fable having to do with Heracles trying to fight his way out when confronted with an aporetic impasse: "Athena saw him and said, 'O Heracles, don't be so surprised! This thing that has brought about your confusion is Aporia (Difficulty) and Eris (Strife). If you just leave it alone, it stays small; but if you decide to fight it, then it swells from its small size and grows large'" (Aesop 2008, 245–246). Here, fighting the impasse lies in the attempt to get rid of it, generally speaking in capturing, or rather pinning either of the aspects down with the brutish force of ignorance. Cutting the Gordian knot in half may "solve" the unsolvable, yet the result annihilates the inherently productive situation that is the most productive when left alone, unsolved, left-being-an-impasse, aporetic, controversial, and split.

The question of the division of the art and the artist may sometimes seem pressing but, in the light of thinking aporias, shall never be answered, "there is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross, no opposition between two sides: the limit is too porous, permeable, and indeterminate" (Derrida 1993, 20). Just as with the original Greek mythos, one feature defines the other. Is there really an art without its artist? Is there any artist where there's no art? The pressure of the questions "Which one?" or "How can I forget?" or "How can I forgive?" causes the vibration that leads to the productive discussion. "It appears to be paradoxical enough so that the partitioning among multiple figures of aporia does not oppose figures to each other, but instead installs the haunting of the one in the other" (Derrida 1993, 20). The importance of being pondered or being discussed makes itself clear when one, instead, writes it as the importance of *being-pondered* or *being-discussed*, forever tying the discussion to cultural existence and further social production.

But it may be the static-representative thought of more traditional philosophies, propagating their love of knowledge as a final product and an end-in-itself rather than a dynamic process, concerned with *being* as a state instead of a process of a dialectic² productivity of aporia, that is the most dangerous to human subjectivity. What represents the human? What size, what sex, shape, or form of the body? And

2 An important distinction must be made: the dialectics which aporia accommodates are not Hegelian dialectics, which strive toward a final synthesis, but rather Adorno's negative dialectics which are much more concerned precisely with the process of the imaginary dialogue. As Adorno himself comments on the distinction: "[Negative dialectic's] motion does not tend to the identity in the difference between each object and its concept; instead, it is suspicious of all identity. Its logic is one of disintegration: of a disintegration of the prepared and objectified form of the concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly" (Adorno 2007, 145).

at what stage in life should a human be held and judged as human, at what age? The brutality of the reduction of human life into any static representation negates its presence immediately. Static representation negates the existence or any “value” of the subject since any static representation speaks about human life to the same extent as though one chose the static representation of a deceased subject. Dead and alive – they are both united on a flat hierarchy because both reduce the subject to the same comparable fraction. Yet – the flow of history never stops, it is like the ever-changing waves of the sea or a river that one shall never enter twice, the waves of chaos and aporia that reflect the human in its impossibility to understand, know, or, in other words, to capture.

Such approaches of aporia may allow for critical ponderings of the multiplicity of every human being, not setting forth a transcendental feature but taking into account the chaos and the endlessness of human variety and difference. Or perhaps, rather of human *différance*, the constantly deferring feature of Derrida’s Deconstruction, not unlike the aporias mentioned. The present insistence on the importance of discussion and the *process* of acquiescence of meaning instead of the *moment* of acquiring it, is also quite similar to the #MeToo’s insistence on uncovering and opening channels of communication which are, arguably, much more desired than any kind of “justice” bestowed on the perpetrators. The open discussion of subjects approached as aporias frees the human from reduction, belittling, and slavery under the orders of justice, morality, or ideology. Just like Deconstruction it is always at work, so is aporia, it must always be at work in order to be at work. It is an impasse in the form of passage that shall never end, a forking in the road always ahead, never to be reached, never to be passed through, always to be passed along.

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