Title: Solomonové koncepce vektorů, její kontext a význam
Variant title:
- Solomon's concept of vectors, its context and meaning
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2021, vol. 22, iss. 2, pp. 14-27
Extent
14-27
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Persistent identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf21-2-2363
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/144822
Type: Article
Language
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
Ve stati představíme teorii vektorů rozhodování Miriam Solomonové, která vytváří komplexní rámec pro uchopení nejrůznějších zkreslení, stereotypů, efektů a heuristik doprovázejících činnost vědců. V úvodu se nicméně vrátíme k nauce o idolech Francise Bacona, která je jedním z jejích předobrazů, přestože je dělí bezmála čtyři staletí. Následně zevrubně popíšeme koncepci Solomonové, především typologii vektorů a její aplikace a omezení, které budou dokumentovány na konkrétních příkladech z historie vědy. Rovněž budeme diskutovat o jejím významu pro filozofii i sociologii vědy, například v souvislosti s teorií kontingence, epistemickou neutralitou, koncepcí "neviditelné ruky", s přihlédnutím k dobovému kontextu i paralelnímu vývoji v dalších disciplínách, jako jsou kognitivní vědy a psychologie. V závěru se pak vrátíme ke srovnání Baconova normativního ideálu a deskriptivní teorie Solomonové a k otázce, zda lze vůbec po staletích vývoje učinit nějaký generalizující úsudek o úloze zkreslení ve vědě.
In this paper, we introduce Miriam Solomon's theory of decision-making vectors, which provides a comprehensive framework for capturing various biases, stereotypes, effects, and heuristics that accompany the activities of scientists. In the introduction we will return to Francis Bacon's doctrine of idols, one of its precursors, although it is nearly four centuries that separate them. We will then describe in detail Solomon's conception, especially the typology of vectors and its applications and limitations, which will be illustrated with concrete examples from the history of science. We will also discuss its relevance to the philosophy and sociology of science, for example in relation to contingency theory, epistemic neutrality, and the concept of the "invisible hand", taking into account the contemporary context and parallel developments in other disciplines such as cognitive science and psychology. In the concluding section we will return to a comparison of Bacon's normative ideal and Solomon's descriptive theory, and to the question of whether, after centuries of development, any generalizing judgment can be made at all about the role of biases in science.
Note
Studie vznikla za podpory Grantové agentury ČR v rámci projektu "Objektivita: Experimentální přístup k tradičnímu filosofickému problému" (č. 18-08239S).
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[33] Solomonová, M. (2020): After Disclosure, in LaCaze, A. – Osimani, B. (eds.): Uncertainty in Pharmacology, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science Vol. 338, Springer.
[34] Tversky, A. – Kahneman, D. (1974): Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, 1124–1131. | DOI 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
[35] Wray, K. (2000): Invisible Hands and the Success of Science, Philosophy of Science 67(1), 163–175. | DOI 10.1086/392767
[36] Ylikoski, P. (1995): The Invisible Hand and Science, Science Studies 8, 32–43.
[37] Zagorin, P. (2001): Francis Bacon's Concept of Objectivity and the Idols of the Mind, The British Journal for the History of Science, 34(4), 379–393. | DOI 10.1017/S0007087401004411
[2] Andersenová, H. – Barker, P. – Chen, X. (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Cambridge University Press.
[3] Bacon, F. (1863): The Two Books of Francis Bacon: Of The Proficience And Advancement Of Learning: Divine And Human, Parker, Son And Bourn.
[4] Bacon, F. (1990): Nové Organon, Svoboda.
[5] Bloor, D. (1976): Knowledge and social imagery, University of Chicago Press.
[6] Dastonová, L. (1991): Baconian facts, academic civility, and the prehistory of objectivity, Annals of Scholarship, 8, 337–363.
[7] Fleck, L. (1979): The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, F. Bradley & T. J. Trenn, University of Chicago Press.
[8] Hacking, I. (1999): The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.
[9] Hanson, N. R. (1958): Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science, Cambridge University Press.
[10] Heilbron, J. L. (1979): Electricity in the 17th 18th Centuries. A Study of Early Modern Physics, University of California Press.
[11] Heilbron, J. L. (1982): Elements of Early Modern Physics, University of California Press.
[12] Hull, D. L. (1988): Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science, The University of Chicago Press.
[13] Hull, D. L. (1997): What’s Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations? Philosophy of Science 64(4), 117–126. | DOI 10.1086/392592
[14] Chase, V. M. – Hertwig, R. – Gigerenzer, G. (1998): Visions of rationality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2(6), 206–214. | DOI 10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01179-6
[15] Christensen-Szalanski, J. J. J. – Beach, L. R. (1984): The citation bias: fad and fashion in the judgement and decision literature, American Psychologist 39(1), 75–78. | DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.39.1.75
[16] Tversky, A. – Kahneman, D. (1974): Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. | DOI 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
[17] Kitcher, P. (1993): The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions, Oxford University Press.
[18] Kuhn, T. S. (1997): Struktura vědeckých revolucí, Oikoymenh.
[19] Kynnová, M. (2008): The 'Heuristics and Biases' Bias in Expert Elicitation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 171, 239–264.
[20] de Melo-Martín, I. (2019): The commercialization of the biomedical sciences: (mis)understanding bias. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 41(3), 34. | DOI 10.1007/s40656-019-0274-x
[21] Merton, R. K. (1973): The normative structure of science, in Merton, R. K. (ed.) The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, University of Chicago Press, 267–278.
[22] Polanyi, M. (1983): The Tacit Dimension, Peter Smith.
[23] Shapirová, B. J. (2003): A Culture of Fact: England 1550–1720, Cornell University Press.
[24] Simon, H. A. (1976): From substantive to procedural rationality, in Latsis, S. J. (ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge University Press, 129–48.
[25] Solerová, L. (2008): Are the results of our science contingent or inevitable? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39, 221–229. | DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.014
[26] Solomonová, J. R. (1998): Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
[27] Solomonová, M. (1992): Scientific Rationality and Human Reasoning, Philosophy of Science, 59(3), University of Chicago Press, 439–455.
[28] Solomonová, M. (1994a): Social Empiricism, Noûs, 28(3), 325–343.
[29] Solomonová, M. (1994b): Multivariate Models of Scientific Change, in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Vol. 2., University of Chicago Press, 287–297.
[30] Solomonová, M. (2001): Social Empiricism, MIT Press.
[31] Solomonová, M. (2010): Groupthink versus The Wisdom of Crowds: The Social Epistemology of Deliberation, and Dissent, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 44(1), 28–42. | DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00028.x
[32] Solomonová, M. (2015): Making medical knowledge, Oxford University Press.
[33] Solomonová, M. (2020): After Disclosure, in LaCaze, A. – Osimani, B. (eds.): Uncertainty in Pharmacology, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science Vol. 338, Springer.
[34] Tversky, A. – Kahneman, D. (1974): Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, 1124–1131. | DOI 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
[35] Wray, K. (2000): Invisible Hands and the Success of Science, Philosophy of Science 67(1), 163–175. | DOI 10.1086/392767
[36] Ylikoski, P. (1995): The Invisible Hand and Science, Science Studies 8, 32–43.
[37] Zagorin, P. (2001): Francis Bacon's Concept of Objectivity and the Idols of the Mind, The British Journal for the History of Science, 34(4), 379–393. | DOI 10.1017/S0007087401004411