Title: Emergence in Ontic Structural Realism
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2023, vol. 24, iss. 2, pp. 1-17
Extent
1-17
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Persistent identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf23-2-37364
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/digilib.79837
Type: Article
Language
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Rights access
open access
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
The paper outlines the understanding of emergence in Ontic Structural Realism of James Ladyman (and his co-author Ross). First, the notion of emergence is explored, surveying the various distinctions associated with it (ontological vs. epistemological, diachronic vs. synchronic, weak vs. strong). It turns out that Ross and Ladyman's notion of emergence is that of weak epistemological emergence compatible with ontic reduction. Particular notions of emergence are associated with the objection embodied in the Generalized Causal Exclusion Argument. The latter is sketched and the solution of Ross and Ladyman is presented: first, in general, the notion of weak emergence is not threatened by this objection. Causal reduction associated with it ensures that there are no competing causal explanations, so no overdetermination arises. Second, there is a peculiar feature of Ross and Ladyman's theory; namely, there is no causation on the fundamental level, only pattern dynamism. Causation emerges only on higher levels of special sciences. Hence, there is no problem of causal overdetermination.
Note
The paper is an outcome of the Czech Science Foundation grant project no. 21-25233S Structure in the Cambridge Group Social Ontology carried out between 2021-2023.
References
[1] Batterman, R. W. (2000): Multiple Realizability and Universality, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51(1), 115-145, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/3541751.
[2] Batterman, R. W. (2019): Universality and RG Explanations, Perspectives on Science 27(1), 26-47, available at: < https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13460/ >.
[3] Bedau, M. A. (1997): Weak Emergence, in Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, Causation, and World, Blackwell, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 375-399, available at: http://people.reed.edu/~mab/papers/weak.emergence.pdf.
[4] Berto, F. – Tagliabue, J. (2012): Cellular Automata, in Zalta, E. (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2012-03-26, rev. 2017-08-22 [accessed 2021-12-30], available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cellular-automata/.
[5] Clayton, P. (2006): Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory, in Davies, P. – Clayton, P. (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-31.
[6] Havlík, V. (2022): Hierarchical Emergent Ontology and the Universal Principle of Emergence, Cham: Springer.
[7] Havlík, V. (2021): Hierarchická emergentní ontologie a univerzální princip emergence, Praha: Filosofia.
[8] Humphreys, P. (2016): Emergence: A Philosophical Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[9] Humphreys, P. (2015): More is Different…Sometimes: Ising Models, Emergence, and Undecidability, in Falkenburg, B. – Morrison, M. (eds.) Why More Is Different: Philosophical Issues in Condensed Matter Physics and Complex Systems. The Frontiers Collection. Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer.
[10] Humphreys, P. (2008): Some Philosophical Consequences of Emergence, Lecture at Chicago Humanities Festival [online], 2008-10-11, [accessed 2021-12-30], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usdT9FtUSAs&t=880s.
[11] Chalmers, D. J. (2006): Strong and Weak Emergence, in Davies, P. – Clayton, P. (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244-254.
[12] Chalmers, D. J. (1996): The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[13] Kim, J. (2009): 'Supervenient and yet not Deducible': Is There a Coherent Concept of Ontological Emergence?, in Hieke, A. – Leitgeb, H. (eds.) Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 54–72.
[14] Kim, J. (1999): Making sense of emergence, Philosophical Studies 95, 3–36, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/4320946 .
[15] Kim, J. (1989): The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism, Proceedings and Addresses of the A-merican Philosophical Association 63(3), 1989, 31–47, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/3130081.
[16] Ladyman, J. (2009): Weak Physicalism and Special Science Ontology, in Hieke A. – Leitgeb H. (eds.) Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 114-125.
[17] Ladyman, J. (2008): Structural Realism and the Relationship between the Special Sciences and Physics, in Bicchieri, C. – Alexander J. (eds.) Philosophy of Science 75(5), Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 744-755.
[18] Ladyman, J. – Ross, D. (2007): Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[19] Manafu, A. (2015): The Prospects for Fusion Emergence, in Pȃrvu I. – Sandu G. – Toader, I. D. (eds.) Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 313, New York: Springer, 221-235.
[20] Morrison, M. (2012): Emergent Physics and Micro-Ontology, Philosophy of Science 79(1), 141-166, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663240.
[21] O'Connor, T. (2000): Causality, Mind, and Free Will, Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 105-11, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/2676124.
[22] O'Connor, T. (1994): Emergent Properties, American Philosophical Quarterly 31(2), 91-104, available at: https://toconnor.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OConnor_Emergent-Proper-ties-1994.pdf.
[23] Plantinga A. (1974): The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[24] Reutlinger, A. (2017): Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation, Synthese, 194 (7), 2291-2305, available at: < https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10897/>.
[25] Spurrett, D. – Ross, D. (2003): Three ways of worrying about 'causation', ResearchGate [on-line], [accessed 2021-12 30], available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/36444126_Three_ways_of_worrying_about_'causation'.
[26] Wilson, J. M. (2015): Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong, in Bigaj T. – Christian Wuthrich, C. (eds.) Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 104, Leiden – Boston: Brill – Rodopi, 251-306.
[27] Wilson, J. M. (2021): Metaphysical Emergence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[28] Wilson, J. M. (2021b): Metaphysical Emergence in Complex Systems, at the Workshop of the Reading Group 'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics' Institut Néel (CNRS - Grenoble) [online], 2021-06-18, [accessed 2021-12-30], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kT4lfKj1YUg&t=1757s .
[2] Batterman, R. W. (2019): Universality and RG Explanations, Perspectives on Science 27(1), 26-47, available at: < https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13460/ >.
[3] Bedau, M. A. (1997): Weak Emergence, in Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, Causation, and World, Blackwell, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 375-399, available at: http://people.reed.edu/~mab/papers/weak.emergence.pdf.
[4] Berto, F. – Tagliabue, J. (2012): Cellular Automata, in Zalta, E. (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2012-03-26, rev. 2017-08-22 [accessed 2021-12-30], available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cellular-automata/.
[5] Clayton, P. (2006): Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory, in Davies, P. – Clayton, P. (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-31.
[6] Havlík, V. (2022): Hierarchical Emergent Ontology and the Universal Principle of Emergence, Cham: Springer.
[7] Havlík, V. (2021): Hierarchická emergentní ontologie a univerzální princip emergence, Praha: Filosofia.
[8] Humphreys, P. (2016): Emergence: A Philosophical Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[9] Humphreys, P. (2015): More is Different…Sometimes: Ising Models, Emergence, and Undecidability, in Falkenburg, B. – Morrison, M. (eds.) Why More Is Different: Philosophical Issues in Condensed Matter Physics and Complex Systems. The Frontiers Collection. Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer.
[10] Humphreys, P. (2008): Some Philosophical Consequences of Emergence, Lecture at Chicago Humanities Festival [online], 2008-10-11, [accessed 2021-12-30], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usdT9FtUSAs&t=880s.
[11] Chalmers, D. J. (2006): Strong and Weak Emergence, in Davies, P. – Clayton, P. (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244-254.
[12] Chalmers, D. J. (1996): The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[13] Kim, J. (2009): 'Supervenient and yet not Deducible': Is There a Coherent Concept of Ontological Emergence?, in Hieke, A. – Leitgeb, H. (eds.) Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 54–72.
[14] Kim, J. (1999): Making sense of emergence, Philosophical Studies 95, 3–36, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/4320946 .
[15] Kim, J. (1989): The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism, Proceedings and Addresses of the A-merican Philosophical Association 63(3), 1989, 31–47, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/3130081.
[16] Ladyman, J. (2009): Weak Physicalism and Special Science Ontology, in Hieke A. – Leitgeb H. (eds.) Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 114-125.
[17] Ladyman, J. (2008): Structural Realism and the Relationship between the Special Sciences and Physics, in Bicchieri, C. – Alexander J. (eds.) Philosophy of Science 75(5), Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 744-755.
[18] Ladyman, J. – Ross, D. (2007): Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[19] Manafu, A. (2015): The Prospects for Fusion Emergence, in Pȃrvu I. – Sandu G. – Toader, I. D. (eds.) Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 313, New York: Springer, 221-235.
[20] Morrison, M. (2012): Emergent Physics and Micro-Ontology, Philosophy of Science 79(1), 141-166, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663240.
[21] O'Connor, T. (2000): Causality, Mind, and Free Will, Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 105-11, available at: https://jstor.org/stable/2676124.
[22] O'Connor, T. (1994): Emergent Properties, American Philosophical Quarterly 31(2), 91-104, available at: https://toconnor.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OConnor_Emergent-Proper-ties-1994.pdf.
[23] Plantinga A. (1974): The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[24] Reutlinger, A. (2017): Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation, Synthese, 194 (7), 2291-2305, available at: < https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10897/>.
[25] Spurrett, D. – Ross, D. (2003): Three ways of worrying about 'causation', ResearchGate [on-line], [accessed 2021-12 30], available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/36444126_Three_ways_of_worrying_about_'causation'.
[26] Wilson, J. M. (2015): Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong, in Bigaj T. – Christian Wuthrich, C. (eds.) Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 104, Leiden – Boston: Brill – Rodopi, 251-306.
[27] Wilson, J. M. (2021): Metaphysical Emergence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[28] Wilson, J. M. (2021b): Metaphysical Emergence in Complex Systems, at the Workshop of the Reading Group 'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics' Institut Néel (CNRS - Grenoble) [online], 2021-06-18, [accessed 2021-12-30], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kT4lfKj1YUg&t=1757s .