Title: Ideas, indexicals, and the private language in Frege's philosophy
Variant title:
- Představy, indexické výrazy a soukromý jazyk ve Fregeho filosofii
Source document: Studia philosophica. 2024, vol. 71, iss. 2, pp. 7-20
Extent
7-20
-
ISSN1803-7445 (print)2336-453X (online)
Persistent identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/SPh2024-2-2
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/digilib.81188
Type: Article
Language
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Rights access
open access
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
The study concerns a possible private language in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, particularly in his scarce investigation of indexicals such as 'I' and 'now'. The indexicals may be seen as private from the late-Wittgensteinian perspective because their sense (Sinn) cannot be repeated outside of a specific linguistic context of the expression. The study examines whether these indexicals presuppose a private language. If Frege's philosophy contains such privateness (for which only insufficient evidence can be found), it would be peculiar since a major part of his work implies that all thoughts are objective and publicly communicable. However, the privateness in Frege's remarks rather differs from Wittgenstein's, for the indexical's sense should be principally expressible at any time.
Studie pojednává o možné soukromosti jazyka ve filosofii Gottloba Fregeho, zejména v jeho drobných a epizodických zkoumáních indexických výrazů, jako jsou "já" a "teď". Tyto výrazy lze z perspektivy pozdního Wittgensteina považovat za soukromé, protože jejich smysl (Sinn) nelze zopakovat mimo určitý jazykový kontext promluvy. Studie zkoumá, jestli indexické výrazy předpokládají soukromý jazyk. Pokud by Fregeho filosofie obsahovala takovou soukromost (pro což nelze najít dostatečnou evidenci), bylo by to v kontrastu s tím, že zbytek jeho díla naznačuje, že veškeré jazykově sdílené myšlenky jsou objektivní, a proto veřejně sdělitelné. Ovšem soukromost probíraná Fregem se zjevně odlišuje od té Wittgensteinovy, protože smysl indexů by měl být v principu vyjádřitelný vždy.
References
[1] BRAUN, David. Indexicals. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [on-line, cit. 17. 9. 2024]. Accessible from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/.
[2] CANDLISH, Steward – WRISLEY, George. Private Language. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [on-line, cit. 19. 9. 2024]. Accessible from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/.
[3] CASTAÑEDA, Hector-Neri. On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others. The Journal of Philosophy. 1968, 65(15), p. 439–456.
[4] FREGE, Gottlob. On Sinn and Bedeutung. In FREGE, Gottlob – BEANEY, Michael (ed.). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishing 1997, p. 151–171.
[5] FREGE, Gottlob. Thought. In FREGE, Gottlob – BEANEY, Michael (ed.) The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishing 1997, p. 325–345.
[6] KAPLAN, David. Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals. In ALMOG, Joseph – PERRY, John – WETTSTEIN, Howard (eds.). Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press 1989, p. 481–563.
[7] PERRY, John. Frege on Demonstratives. The Philosophical Review. 1977, 86(4), p. 474– 497.
[8] WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret ANSCOMBE – Peter Michael Stephan HACKER – Joachim SCHULTE. 4th ed. Blackwell Publishing 2009.
[2] CANDLISH, Steward – WRISLEY, George. Private Language. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [on-line, cit. 19. 9. 2024]. Accessible from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/.
[3] CASTAÑEDA, Hector-Neri. On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others. The Journal of Philosophy. 1968, 65(15), p. 439–456.
[4] FREGE, Gottlob. On Sinn and Bedeutung. In FREGE, Gottlob – BEANEY, Michael (ed.). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishing 1997, p. 151–171.
[5] FREGE, Gottlob. Thought. In FREGE, Gottlob – BEANEY, Michael (ed.) The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishing 1997, p. 325–345.
[6] KAPLAN, David. Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals. In ALMOG, Joseph – PERRY, John – WETTSTEIN, Howard (eds.). Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press 1989, p. 481–563.
[7] PERRY, John. Frege on Demonstratives. The Philosophical Review. 1977, 86(4), p. 474– 497.
[8] WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret ANSCOMBE – Peter Michael Stephan HACKER – Joachim SCHULTE. 4th ed. Blackwell Publishing 2009.