Název: Pluralistická odpověď na otázku obsahu lidové psychologie
Variantní název:
- The pluralist answer to the question of the content of folk psychology
Zdrojový dokument: Pro-Fil. 2021, roč. 22, č. 1, s. 1-16
Rozsah
1-16
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Trvalý odkaz (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf21-1-2237
Trvalý odkaz (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/144022
Type: Článek
Jazyk
Licence: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Upozornění: Tyto citace jsou generovány automaticky. Nemusí být zcela správně podle citačních pravidel.
Abstrakt(y)
Lidová psychologie coby základ naší schopnosti vysvětlovat a předvídat jednání je významné téma filozofie mysli. Debaty, které ji obklopují, se nicméně v minulosti zaměřovaly primárně na otázky jejího statusu v rámci vědeckého zkoumání mysli a formy ji zakládajících mechanismů (teorie, simulace aj.). Relativně menší pozornost byla věnována otázce obsahu lidové psychologie – tedy tomu, které koncepty či schopnosti pod označení "lidová psychologie" řadit. V článku se zabývám právě otázkou obsahu a možné odpovědi na otázku obsahu předloženou pluralistickým pojetím lidové psychologie. Nejdříve uvádím některé argumenty zpochybňující standardní pojetí lidové psychologie a následně představuji pojetí pluralismu rozšiřující lidovou psychologii o řadu sociálně kognitivních schopností. V závěru se krátce věnuji tomu, jaké dopady by takto šířeji pojímaná lidová psychologie mohla mít pro otázky jejího statusu a formy.
Folk psychology as the basis of our capacity to explain and predict behavior is one of the main topics of the philosophy of mind. However, the discussions surrounding it have focused primarily on the questions of its status in the scientific study of the mind and the form of its constitutive mechanisms (theory, form, etc.). Relatively less attention has been paid to the question of its content – which concepts or abilities to sort under the label "folk psychology". I will focus on the question of content and one possible answer to it given by the pluralist view of folk psychology. First, I will provide some arguments questioning the standard view of folk psychology and then I will introduce the pluralist view, which broadens folk psychology by a number of social cognition abilities. Finally, I will briefly focus on the consequences of this broader construal of folk psychology for the questions of status and form.
Note
Příspěvek vznikl za podpory MŠMT ČR udělené UP v Olomouci (IGA_FF_2020_003).
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[2] Amodio, D. M. (2014): The Neuroscience of Prejudice and Stereotyping, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15(10), 670–682, dostupné z: < https://nature.com/articles/nrn3800 >. | DOI 10.1038/nrn3800
[3] Andersen, S. M. – Klatzky, R. L. – Murray, J. (1990): Traits and Social Stereotypes: Efficiency Differences in Social Information Processing, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(2), 192–201, dostupné z: < https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1991-01189-001 >.
[4] Andrews, K. (2007): Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology, in Hutto D. – Ratcliffe, M. (eds.) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Dordrecht, 191–209.
[5] Andrews, K. (2008): It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology, Synthese, 165(1), 13–29, dostupné z: < https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-007-9230-5 >. | DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9230-5
[6] Andrews, K. (2012): Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology, MIT Press.
[7] Banaji, M. R. – Hardin, C. – Rothman, A. J. (1993): Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(2), 272–281, dostupné z: < https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1993-45207-001 >.
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[13] Bermúdez, J. L. (2009): Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom, in Lurz R. W. (ed.) The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press, 145–164.
[14] Budesheim, T. L. – Bonnelle, K. (1998): The Use of Abstract Trait Knowledge and Behavioral Exemplars in Causal Explanations of Behavior, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(6), 575–587, dostupné z: < https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167298246002 >.
[15] Clark, A. (1993): The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic, Mind & Language, 8(2), 223–233, dostupné z: < https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1994-24859-001 >. | DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00282.x
[16] Dennett, Daniel C. (1998): The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[17] Fiebich, A. (2019): In Defense of Pluralist Theory, Synthese, dostupné z: < https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02490-5 >.
[18] Fiebich, A. – Gallagher, S. – Hutto, D. (2016): Pluralism, Interaction and the Ontogeny of Social Cognition, in Kiverstein, J. (ed.) The Philosophy of the Social Mind, Routledge, 208–221.
[19] Fodor, J. A. (1987): Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press.
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[21] Gallagher, S. – Fiebich, A. (2019): Being Pluralist About Understanding Others: Contexts and Communicative Practices, in Avramides, A. – Parrott, M. (eds.) Knowing Other Minds, Oxford University Press, 63–78.
[22] Goldman, A. I. (1989): Interpretation Psychologized, Mind & Language, 4(3), 161–185, dostupné z: < https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1989.tb00249.x >. | DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1989.tb00249.x
[23] Goldman, A. I. (2006): Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading, Oxford University Press.
[24] Gopnik, A. – Meltzoff, A. N. (1997): Words, thoughts, and theories, The MIT Press.
[25] Gordon, R. M. (1986): Folk Psychology as Simulation. Mind & Language, 1(2), 158–171, dostupné z: < https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x >. | DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x
[26] Gray, C. (2010): The New Social Story Book, Future Horizons.
[27] Hartner, D. F. (2016): Folk Psychology Revisited: The Methodological Problem and the Autonomy of Psychology. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 9(1), 22–54, dostupné z: < https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/spe/article/view/14471 >.
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[34] Lewis, D. K. (1972): Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3), 249–258, dostupné z: < https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048407212341301 >. | DOI 10.1080/00048407212341301
[35] Martin, C. L. (2000): Cognitive Theories of Gender Development, in Eckes, T. – Trautner, H. M. (eds.) The developmental social psychology of gender, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 91–121.
[36] Mason, M. F. – Cloutier, J. – Macrae, C. N. (2006): On Construing Others: Category and Stereotype Activation from Facial Cues, Social Cognition, 24(5), 540–562, dostupné z: < https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-20823-003 >.
[37] McGeer, V. (2007): The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology, in Hutto, D. – Ratcliffe,M. (eds.) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Springer, 137–156.
[38] Morton, A. (2007): Folk Psychology Does Not Exist, in Hutto, D. – Ratcliffe, M. (eds.) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Springer, 211–221.
[39] Nichols, S. – Stich, S. P. (2003): Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, SelfAwareness, and Understanding Other Minds, Oxford University Press.
[40] Olivola, C. Y. – Todorov, A. (2010): Fooled by First Impressions? Reexamining the Diagnostic Value of Appearance-based Inferences, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 315–324, dostupné z: < https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103109003084 >. | DOI 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.12.002
[41] Ratcliffe, M. (2007): From Folk Psychology to Commonsense, in Hutto, D. – Ratcliffe, M. (eds.) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Springer, 223–243.
[42] Ravenscroft, I. (2019): Folk Psychology as a Theory, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 1997-09-22, rev. 2016-08-16 [cit. 2020-12-10], dostupné z: < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/folkpsych-theory/ >.
[43] Rosenberg, A. (2018): How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories, The MIT Press.
[44] Ross, L. – Nisbett, R. (2011): The Person and the Situation Perspectives of Social Psychology, Pinter & Martin Ltd.
[45] Spaulding, S. (2018): How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, Routledge.
[46] Stich, S. P. (1986): From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, MIT Press.
[47] Todorov, A. – Uleman, J. S. (2003), The Efficiency of Binding Spontaneous Trait Inferences to Actors' Faces, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(6), 549–562, dostupné z: < https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103103000593 >.
[48] Von Eckardt, B. (1997): The Empirical Naivete in the Current Philosophical Conception of Folk Psychology, in Carrier, M. – Machamer, P. K. (eds.) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press, 23–51.
[49] Wellman, H. M. – Cross, D. – Watson, J. (2001): Meta-analysis of Theory-of-mind Development: The Truth About False Belief, Child Development, 72(3), 655–684, dostupné z: < https://jstor.org/stable/1132444?seq=1 >.
[50] Westra, E. (2018): Character and Theory of Mind: An Integrative Approach, Philosophical Studies, 175(5), 1217–1241. dostupné z: < https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0908-3 >. | DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0908-3
[51] Westra, E. (2019): Stereotypes, Theory of Mind, and the Action–prediction Hierarchy, Synthese, 196(7), 2821–2846. dostupné z: < https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1575-9 >.
[52] Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991): The Relationship between Scientific Psychology and Common-Sense Psychology, Synthese, 89(1), 15–39. dostupné z: < https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116955?seq=1 >. | DOI 10.1007/BF00413797
[53] Zawidzki, T. W. (2013): Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition, The MIT Press.