Title: Argument holandské sázky ve prospěch probabilismu?
Variant title:
- Dutch Book Argument in favor of Probabilism?
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2015, vol. 16, iss. 1, pp. [62]-81
Extent
[62]-81
-
ISSN1212-9097
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/134143
Type: Article
Language
License: Not specified license
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
Cílem této práce je rozebrat možnosti argumentu holandské sázky ve prospěch probabilismu a stanovit jeho meze. Existuje mnoho podob argumentu, proto se nejprve budu věnovat popisu argumentu v jeho klasické podobě. Následně je podroben kritice ve třech oblastech: (1) problémy behaviorismu, (2) užitku peněz, (3) vztah koherence, jisté ztráty a racionality. Zásadní je dle mého především třetí oblast týkající se neschopnosti jednoduše propojit probabilistickou nekoherenci stupňů přesvědčení s jistou ztrátou a pragmatickou racionalitou. Věnuji se třem současným reinterpretacím argumentu ve prospěch probabilistických norem (Armendt, Howson, Christensen), přičemž v textu docházím k závěru, že ani jedna z nich není uspokojivá. Selhávají v řešení problémů (Armendt, Christensen), nebo neříkají nic zajímavého ve prospěch probabilismu (Howson). Proto se domnívám, že rozbor argumentu především ukazuje, že pragmatická obhajoba epistemických norem racionality, jako je ta v argumentu holandské sázky, není pro probabilismus schůdnou cestou. Závěr se snaží nastínit, proč tomu tak je.
The aim of this study is to consider possibilities of a Dutch Book Argument in favor of Probabilism and to determine its limits. There are many versions of the argument; therefore at first I analyze a description of a classic version of the argument. After that it sheds light on three problematic areas of the argument: (1) problems of behaviorism, (2) an utility of money, (3) relation between a coherence, a sure lose and rationality. The significant is mainly the third area regarding a failure to create a simple connection between probabilistic coherence of degrees of belief, a concept of sure lose and pragmatic rationality. I consider three contemporary reinterpretations of the argument in favor of probabilistic norms (Ardment, Howson, Christensen), and I conclude that neither of them is acceptable. They fail to solve the problems (Armendt, Christensen) or they don't speak in favor of Probabilism (Howson). Therefore I think the analysis of the argument primarily shows that pragmatic defense of epistemic norms of rationality by means of the Dutch Book Argument is not workable solution for Probabilism. The conclusion tries to briefly describe why it is so.
References
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[22] MAHER, P. (2006) Book Review : David Christensen. Putting Logic in its Place. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 47, no. 1, s. 133‒149. | DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1143468316
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[27] STRAWSON, G. (2010) Mental reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[28] VINEBERG, S. (1997) DUTCH BOOKS, DUTCH STRATEGIES AND WHAT THEY SHOW ABOUT RATIONALITY. Philosophical Studies. vol. 86, no. 2, s. 185‒201. | DOI 10.1023/A:1017932926382
[29] VINEBERG, S. (2001) The Notion of Consistency for Partial Belief. Philosophical Studies, vol. 102, no. 3, s. 281‒296. | DOI 10.1023/A:1010309526393
[30] ZYNDA, L. (2000) Representation Theorems and Realism about Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 1, s. 45‒69. | DOI 10.1086/392761
[2] DE FINETTI, B. (1980) Foresight: its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources. In KYBURG, H. – SMOKLER, H. (eds.) Studies in subjective probability. 2d ed. Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, s. 53–118.
[3] DOUVEN, Igor. (2004) On Bayesian Logic. In Galavotti, M. (eds.) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, s. 321‒326.
[4] EASWARAN, K. (2011) Bayesianism I. Philosophy Compass, vol. 6, no. 5, s. 312‒320. | DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x
[5] FOLEY, R. (1993) Working without a net. New York: Oxford University Press.
[6] HACKING, I. (2001) An introduction to probability and inductive logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[7] HÁJEK, A. (2005) Scotching Dutch Books?. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 19, no.1, s. 139‒151. | DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00057.x
[8] HÁJEK, A. – ERIKSSON L. (2007) What Are Degrees of Belief?. Studia Logica: Special Issue Formal Epistemology I, vol. 86, s. 183‒213. | DOI 10.1007/s11225-007-9059-4
[9] HÁJEK, A. (2008) Arguments For ‒ Or Against ‒ Probabilism?. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 59, no. 4, s. 793‒819. | DOI 10.1093/bjps/axn045
[10] HÁJEK, A. (2009) Dutch Book Arguments. In ANAND, P. – PATTANAIK P. K. – Clemens P (eds.) The handbook of rational and social choice. New York: Oxford University Press, s. 173‒195.
[11] HEIL, J. (2004) Philosophy of mind. New York: Routledge.
[12] HOWSON, C. – URBACH P. (1993) Scientific reasoning. 2nd ed. Chicago: Open Court.
[13] HOWSON, C. (2003) Probability and logic. Journal of Applied Logic, vol. 1, no. 3-4, s. 151‒165. | DOI 10.1016/S1570-8683(03)00011-9
[14] HOWSON, C. (2004) Bayesian Evidence. In Galavotti, M. (eds.) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, s. 301‒320.
[15] CHILDERS, T. (2001) Co je pravděpodobnost?. Bratislava: Aleph.
[16] CHRISTENSEN, D. (2007) Putting logic in its place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[17] JAMES, W. (1907) Will to Believe. In Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans Green and Co, s. 1‒31. Dostupné z: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Will_to_Believe_and_Other_Essays_in_Popular_Philosophy
[18] JOYCE, J. (1998) A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science, vol. 65, no. 4, s. 575‒603. | DOI 10.1086/392661
[19] KEMENY, J. (1955) Fair bets and inductive probabilities. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 20, no. 03, s. 263‒273. | DOI 10.2307/2268222
[20] KIM, J. (1996) Philosophy of mind. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.
[21] MAHER, P. (1997) Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments. Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, no. 2, s. 291‒305. | DOI 10.1086/392552
[22] MAHER, P. (2006) Book Review : David Christensen. Putting Logic in its Place. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 47, no. 1, s. 133‒149. | DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1143468316
[23] PUTNAM, Hilary. (1997) Brains and behavior. In PUTNAM, H. (eds.) Mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University, s. 325‒341.
[24] RAMSEY, F. (1980) Truth and Probability. In KYBURG, H. – SMOKLER, H. (eds.) Studies in subjective probability. 2d ed. Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, s. 23‒52.
[25] SCHICK, F. (1986) Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps. The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83, no. 2, s. 112‒119. | DOI 10.2307/2026054
[26] SKYRMS, B. (1987) Coherence. In RESCHER, N. Scientific inquiry in philosophical perspective. Lanham: University Press of America, s. 225‒242.
[27] STRAWSON, G. (2010) Mental reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[28] VINEBERG, S. (1997) DUTCH BOOKS, DUTCH STRATEGIES AND WHAT THEY SHOW ABOUT RATIONALITY. Philosophical Studies. vol. 86, no. 2, s. 185‒201. | DOI 10.1023/A:1017932926382
[29] VINEBERG, S. (2001) The Notion of Consistency for Partial Belief. Philosophical Studies, vol. 102, no. 3, s. 281‒296. | DOI 10.1023/A:1010309526393
[30] ZYNDA, L. (2000) Representation Theorems and Realism about Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 1, s. 45‒69. | DOI 10.1086/392761