Title: Austin and Quine on the dogmas
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2016, vol. 17, iss. 1, pp. [36]-48
Extent
[36]-48
-
ISSN1212-9097
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/135707
Type: Article
Language
License: Not specified license
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
Austin and Quine both reacted to the logical positivism of Carnap, but they did it from different positions. While Quine with his pragmatic rejection of the analytic – synthetic divide and confirmation holism represents a modification and continuation of the tradition, Austin challenges its underlying assumptions: the prominent role of mathematics as a model for natural language and the dichotomy physical object – sense datum. His criticism is paralleled here by the later Wittgenstein in On Certainty and Philosophical Investigations, reacting to his earlier logical phase. But there seems to be no room left for the traditional questions of the philosophy of mathematics in Austin's natural language approach.
Austin a Quine reagovali na Carnapův logický pozitivismus, ovšem z rozdílných pozic. Zatímco Quine z pragmatických pozic odmítá rozdělení na analytické a syntetické věty, svým konfirmačním holismem pokračuje v tradici logického pozitivismu, Austin odmítá už samotné jeho předpoklady: paradigmatickou roli matematiky pro přirozený jazyk a dichotomii fyzický předmět – smyslové datum. Svojí kritikou zrcadlí Wittgensteinovu pozdní fázi v O jistotě a Filozofických zkoumáních, kteréžto knihy reagují na ranou logizující fázi Traktátu. Ovšem Austinův radikální postoj, zdá se, neumožňuje tematizování tradičních otázek filozofie matematiky.
Note
My research has been funded by grant no. P401/11/0371 'Apriority, Syntheticity and Analyticity from Medieval Thought to Contemporary Philosophy' provided by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic to the Institute of Philosophy for the years 2011–2015.
References
[1] Austin, J. L. (1961a): "Are There A Priori Concepts?" In Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, 32–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[2] Austin, J. L. (1961b): "The Meaning of a Word." In Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, 55–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[3] Austin, J. L. (1962): Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[4] Ayer, A. J. (1969): "Has Austin Refuted Sense-Data?" In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 284–308. London: Routledge.
[5] Berlin, I. (1973): "Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy." In Berlin et al.: Essays on J. L. Austin, 1–16. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[6] Quine, W. V. O. (1961): "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In Quine, W. V. O.: From a Logical Point of View, 20–46. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
[7] Quine, W. V. O. (1969): "II. W. V. O. Quine." In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 86–90. London: Routledge.
[8] Tomeček, M. (2006): "Pohlcení sémantiky pragmatikou." In Zouhar, M.: Jazyk z pohľadu sémantiky, pragmatiky a filozofie vedy, 33-7. Bratislava: Filozofický ústav SAV.
[9] Tomeček, M. (2010): "Jméno ve spise O jistotě." In Ludmila Dostálová, Radek Schuster: Studie k filosofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina, 197-205. Prague: Filosofia.
[10] Urmson, J. O. (1969): "I. J. O. Urmson." In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 76–86. London: Routledge.
[2] Austin, J. L. (1961b): "The Meaning of a Word." In Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, 55–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[3] Austin, J. L. (1962): Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[4] Ayer, A. J. (1969): "Has Austin Refuted Sense-Data?" In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 284–308. London: Routledge.
[5] Berlin, I. (1973): "Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy." In Berlin et al.: Essays on J. L. Austin, 1–16. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[6] Quine, W. V. O. (1961): "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In Quine, W. V. O.: From a Logical Point of View, 20–46. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
[7] Quine, W. V. O. (1969): "II. W. V. O. Quine." In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 86–90. London: Routledge.
[8] Tomeček, M. (2006): "Pohlcení sémantiky pragmatikou." In Zouhar, M.: Jazyk z pohľadu sémantiky, pragmatiky a filozofie vedy, 33-7. Bratislava: Filozofický ústav SAV.
[9] Tomeček, M. (2010): "Jméno ve spise O jistotě." In Ludmila Dostálová, Radek Schuster: Studie k filosofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina, 197-205. Prague: Filosofia.
[10] Urmson, J. O. (1969): "I. J. O. Urmson." In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 76–86. London: Routledge.