Title: Gewirthian prudence, generic agency, and moral rights
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2024, vol. 25, iss. 1, pp. 1-11
Extent
1-11
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Persistent identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf24-1-38019
Stable URL (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/digilib.80409
Type: Article
Language
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Rights access
open access
Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.
Abstract(s)
Much critical attention has been given to Alan Gewirth's argument concerning agents' move from prudential to moral right-claims. Less ink has been spilled on the question of why prudent agents should claim rights to goods needed by agents in general rather than to goods needed for the realization of their individual and particular purposes. In this paper, I intend to show that Gewirth's concept of prudence makes it necessary for agents to identify with the role of a generic agent and that this identification provides them with rationally valid reasons not only to claim prudential rights to freedom and well-being but also to recognize a moral principle stating that all agents have these rights. More generally, my argument points to the central role played by the concept of prudence in his theory.
References
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[11] Gewirth, A. (1998): Self-Fulfillment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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[16] Kant, I. (1993): Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Indianapolis, IND: Hackett Publishing Company.
[17] McMahon, C. (1986): Gewirth's Justification of Morality, Philosophical Studies 50(2), 261–281.
[18] Plato (1987): The Republic, London: Penguin Books.
[19] Scheuermann, J. (1987): Gewirth's Concept of Prudential Rights, The Philosophical Quarterly 37(148), 291–304.
[20] Schwartz, A. (1979): Review of Reason and Morality, The Philosophical Review 88(4), 654–656.
[21] Sterba, J. P. (1987): Justifying Morality: The Right and the Wrong Ways, Synthese 72(1), 45–69.
[22] Williams, B. (1985): Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana Press.
[2] Aristotle (1981): The Politics, London: Penguin Books.
[3] Beyleveld, D. (1991): The Dialectical Necessity of Morality, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
[4] Bond, E. J. (1980): Gewirth on Reason and Morality, Metaphilosophy 11(1), 36–53.
[5] Gewirth, A. (1956): Marsilius of Padua. Volume II: The Defensor pacis, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
[6] Gewirth, A. (1978): Reason and Morality, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
[7] Gewirth, A. (1984): Replies to My Critics, in Regis, E. Jr. (ed.) Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 192–255.
[8] Gewirth, A. (1985): From the Prudential to the Moral: Reply to Singer, Ethics 95(2), 302–304.
[9] Gewirth, A. (1988): The Justification of Morality, Philosophical Studies 53(2), 245–262.
[10] Gewirth, A. (1996): The Community of Rights, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
[11] Gewirth, A. (1998): Self-Fulfillment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[12] Haidt, J. (2012): The Righteous Mind, London: Penguin Books.
[13] Hare, R. M. (1981): Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[14] Hare, R. M. (1984): Do Agents Have to be Moralists?, in Regis, E. Jr. (ed.) Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 52–58.
[15] Held, V. (1985): Reason and Economic Justice, in Kipnis, K. – Meyers, D. T. (eds.) Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 33–41.
[16] Kant, I. (1993): Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Indianapolis, IND: Hackett Publishing Company.
[17] McMahon, C. (1986): Gewirth's Justification of Morality, Philosophical Studies 50(2), 261–281.
[18] Plato (1987): The Republic, London: Penguin Books.
[19] Scheuermann, J. (1987): Gewirth's Concept of Prudential Rights, The Philosophical Quarterly 37(148), 291–304.
[20] Schwartz, A. (1979): Review of Reason and Morality, The Philosophical Review 88(4), 654–656.
[21] Sterba, J. P. (1987): Justifying Morality: The Right and the Wrong Ways, Synthese 72(1), 45–69.
[22] Williams, B. (1985): Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana Press.